[Gregory Bateson is kind of a '60s guy, always trying to force his acute empirical observations of human behavior into a theory and getting into conceptual entanglements and fog. Yet he resists magisterium and has a lighter touch than most comparable intellectuals of his time. . . this is a rather too long Post but National Character is a long-standing interest of mine so I thought I should include the entire text of this paper here.]
Morale and National Character*
We shall proceed as follows. (1) We shall examine some of the criticisms which
can be urged against our entertaining any concept of ‘national character.’ (2)
This examination will enable us to state certain conceptual limits within which
the phrase ‘national character’ is likely to be valid. (3) We shall then go on,
within these limits, to outline what orders of difference we may expect to find
among Western nations, trying, by way of illustration, to guess more concretely
at some of these differences. (4) Lastly, we shall consider how the problems of
morale and international relations are effected by differences of this order.
Barriers
to Any Concept of ‘National Character’
Scientific enquiry has been diverted from questions of this type by a
number of trains of thought which lead scientists to regard all such questions
as unprofitable
and unsound. Before we hazard any constructive opinion as to the order of
differences to be expected among European populations, therefore, these
diverting trains of thought must be examined.
It is, in the first place, argued that not the people but the circumstances
under which they live differ from one community to another; that we have to
deal with differences in historical backgrounds or in current conditions, and
that these factors are sufficient to account for all the differences in behavior
without invoking any differences of character in the individual’s concerned.
Essentially this argument is an appeal to Occam’s Razor – an assertion that we
ought not to multiply entities beyond necessity. The argument is that, where
observable differences in circumstances exist, we ought to evoke those rather
than mere differences in character, which we cannot observe.
The argument may be met in part by quoting experimental data, such as Lewin’s
experiments (unpublished material), which shows that there are great
differences in the way in which Germans and Americans respond to failure in an
experimental setting. The Americans treated failure as a challenge to increase
efforts; the German’s responded to the same failure with discouragement. But those who argue for effectiveness of
conditions rather than character can still reply that the experimental
conditions are not, in act, the same for both groups; that the stimulus value
of any circumstance stands out against the background of the other circumstances
in the life of the subject, and that this contrast cannot be the same for both
groups.
It is possible, in fact , to argue that since the same circumstances never
occur for individuals of different cultural backgrounds, it is therefore
unnecessary to invoke such abstractions as national character. This argument,
breaks down, I believe, when it is pointed out that, in stressing circumstances
rather than character, we would be ignoring the known facts about learning. Perhaps the best documented
generalization in the field of psychology is that, at any given moment, the
behavioral characteristics of any mammal, and especially of man, depend upon
the previous experience and behavior of that individual. Thus in presuming that
character, as well as circumstance, must betaken into account, we are not
multiplying entities beyond necessity; we know
of the significance of learned character from other types of data, and it is
this knowledge which compels us to consider the additional ‘entity’.
A second barrier to any acceptance of the notion of ‘national character’ arises
after the first has been negotiated. Those who grant that character must be
considered can still doubt whether any uniformity or regularity is likely to
obtain within such a sample of human beings as constitutes a nation. Let us
grant at once that uniformity
obviously does not occur and let us proceed to consider what sorts of regularity may be expected.
The criticism we are trying to meet is likely to take five forms. 1) The critic
may point to the occurrence of sub-cultural differentiation, to differences
between the sexes or between classes, or between occupational groups within the
community. 2) he may point to the extreme heterogeneity and confusion of
cultural norms which can be observed in ‘melting-pot’ communities. 3) He may point to the accidental
deviant, the individual who has undergone some ‘accidental’ traumatic
experience, not usual among those in his social environment. (4) He may point to the phenomena of cultural change, and
especially the sort of differentiation which results when one part of the
community lags behind some other in rate of change. (5) Lastly, he may point to
the arbitrary nature of national boundaries.
These objections are closely interrelated, and the replies to them derive
ultimately from two postulates: first, that the individual, whether from a
physiological or a psychological point of view, is a single organized entity, such that all its
‘parts’ or ‘aspects’ are mutually modifiable and mutually interacting; second,
that a community is likewise organized in
this sense.
If we look at social differentiation in a stable community –say, at sex
differentiation in a New Guinea tribe- we find that it is not enough to say
that the habit system or the character structure of one sex is different from that of another. The
significant point is that the habit
system of each sex cogs into the habit system of the other; that the
behavior of each promotes the habits
of the other. We find, for example, between the sexes, such complementary patterns as spectatorship-
exhibitionism, dominance-submission, and succoring-dependence, or mixtures of
these. Never do we find mutual irrelevance between such groups.
Although it is unfortunately true that we know very little about the terms of
habit differentiation between classes, sexes, occupational groups, etc., in
Western nations, there is, I think, no danger in applying this general
conclusion to all cases of stable differentiation between groups which are
living in mutual contact. It is, to me, inconceivable that two differing groups
could exist side by side in a community without some mutual relevance between the
special characteristics of one group and those of the other. Such an occurrence
would be contrary to the postulate that a community is an organized unit. We
shall, therefore, presume that this generalization applies to all stable social
differentiation.
(1) [ answering the first criticism]: Now,
all that we know about the mechanics of character formation –especially the
processes of projection, reaction formation, compensation, and the like- forces
us to regard these bi-polar patterns as unitary within the individual. If we
know that an individual is trained in the overt expression of one-half of one
of these patterns, e.g. in dominance behavior, we can predict with certainty
(though not in precise language) that the seeds of the other half -submission-
are simultaneously sown in his personality. We have to think of the individual,
in fact, as trained in dominance -submission, not in either dominance or
submission. From this it follows that where we are dealing with stable
differentiation within a community, we are justified in ascribing common character to the members of that
community, provided we take the
precaution of describing that common character in terms of the motifs of
relationship between the differentiated sections of the community.
The same sort of considerations will guide us in dealing with our second
criticism the extremes of heterogeneity,
such as occur in the modern ‘melting-pot’ communities. 2)Suppose we attempted
to analyze out all the motifs of relationship between individuals and groups in
such a community as New York City; if we did not end up in a madhouse long
before we completed our study, we should arrive at a picture of a common
character that would be almost infinitely complex – certainly that would
contain more fine differentiations than the human psyche is capable of
resolving within itself. At this point, then, both we and the individuals who
we are studying are forced to take a short cut: to treat heterogeneity as a
positive characteristic of the common environment, sui generis. When, with such an hypothesis, we begin the look at
common motifs of behavior, we note the very clear tendencies towards glorifying
in heterogeneity for its own sake (as in the Robinson Latouche ‘Ballad for
Americans’) and toward regarding the world as made up as an infinity of
disconnected quiz-bits (like in Ripley’s ‘Believe It or Not’).
3) The third objection , the case of the individual
deviant, falls in the same frame of reference as that of the differentiation of
stable groups. The boy on whom an English public-school education does not
take, even though the original roots of his deviance were laid in some
‘accidental’ traumatic incident, is reacting to the public-school system.
The behavioral habits which he acquires may not follow the norms which
the schools intend to implant, but they are acquired in reaction to those very
norms. He may (and often does) acquire patterns the exactly opposite of normal;
but he cannot conceivably acquire irrelevant patterns. He may become a ‘bad’ public school Englishman, he may
become insane, but still his deviant characteristics will be systematically
related to the standard public-school character as the character of Iatmul
natives of one sex is systematically related to the character of the other sex.
His character is orientated to the motifs
and patterns of relationship in the society in which he lives.
4) The same frame of reference applies to the fourth consideration, that of
changing communities and the sort of differentiation which occurs when one
section of a community lags behind another in change. Since the direction in
which a change occurs will necessarily
be conditioned by the status quo ante,
the new patterns, being reactions to the old, will by systematically related to
the old. As long as we confine ourselves to the terms and themes of this
systematic relationship, therefore, we are entitled to expect regularity of
character in the individuals. Furthermore, the expectation and experience of change may, in some cases, be so
important as to become a common character-determining factor sui generis, in the same sort of way
that ‘heterogeneity’ may have positive effects.
5) Lastly, we may consider cases of shifting national boundaries. Here, of
course, we cannot expect that a diplomat’s signature on a treaty will
immediately modify the characters of individuals whose national allegiance is
thereby change. It may even happen- for example, in cases where a preliterate
native population is brought for the first time in contact with Europeans-
that, for some time after the shift, the two parties to such a situation will
behave in a exploratory or almost random
manner, each retaining its own norms and not yet developing any special adjustments
to the situation of contact. During this period, we should still not expect any
generalizations to apply to both groups. Very soon, however, we know that each
side does develop special patterns of behavior to use in its contacts with the
other. At this point, it becomes meaningful to ask what systematic terms of
relationship will describe the common character of the two groups; and from
this point on, the degree of common character structure will increase until the
two groups become related to each other just as two classes or sexes in a
stable, differentiated society.
In sum, to those who argue that human communities show too great internal
differentiation or contain too great a random element for any notion of common
character to apply, our reply would be that we expect such an approach to be
useful (a) provided we describe common character in terms of of the themes of relationship between groups and
individuals within the community, and (b) provided we allow sufficient time to
elapse for the community to reach some degree of equilibrium or to accept
either change of heterogeneity as characteristic of their human environment.
Differences Which We May Expect Between
National Groups
The above examination of ‘straw men’ in the case
against ‘national character’ has very stringently limited the scope of this
concept. But the conclusions from this examination are by no means simply
negative. To limit the scope of a concept is almost synonymous with defining
it.
We have added one very important tool to our equipment –the technique of
describing the common character (or the ‘highest common factor’ of character)
of individuals in a human community in terms of bi-polar adjectives. Instead of
despairing in face of the fact that nations are highly differentiated, we shall
take the dimensions of differentiation as our clues to national character. No
longer content to say ‘’Germans are submissive,’ or ‘Englishmen are aloof,’ we
shall use such phrases as ‘dominant-submissive’ when relationships of this sort
can be shown to occur. Similarly, we shall not refer to ‘the paranoidal’
element in German character,’ unless we can show that by ‘paranoidal’ we mean
some bi-polar characteristic of German-German or German-foreign relationships.
We shall not describe varieties of character by defining a given character in
terms of position on a continuum between extreme dominance and extreme
submissiveness, but we shall, instead, try to use for our descriptions some
such continua as ‘degree of interest in, or orientation towards,
dominance-submission.’
So far, we have mentioned only a very short list of bi-polar characteristics:
dominance-submission, succoring-dependence, and exhibitionism-spectatorship.
One criticism will certainly be uppermost in the reader’s mind, that, in short,
all three of these characteristics are clearly present in all Western cultures.
Before our method becomes useful, therefore, we musty try to expand it to give
us sufficient scope and discriminatory power to differentiate one Western culture
from another.
As this conceptual framework develops, no doubt, many further expansions and discriminations
will be introduced. The present paper will deal with only three such types of
expansion.
Alternatives to Bipolarity
When we invoked bipolarity as a means of handing differentiation within society
without foregoing some notion of common character structure, we considered only
the possibility of simple bipolar differentiation. Certainly this pattern is
very common in Western cultures; take, for instance, Republican- Democrat, Right-Left,
Male-Female, God and the Devil, and so
on. These people even try to impose a binary pattern on phenomena which are not
duel in their nature - youth versus age, labor versus capital, mind vs matter
and, in general, they lack the organizational devices for handling triangular
systems; the inception of any third party is always regarded, for example, as a
threat to our political organization. This clear tendency towards dual systems
ought not, however, to blind us to the
occurrence of other patterns.
There is, for example, a very interesting tendency in English communities
towards the formation of ternary systems, such as parents-nurse-child,
king-ministers-people, officers- N. C. O’s-privates. While the precise motifs
of relationship in these ternary systems remain to be investigated, it is important
to note that these systems are neither ‘simple hierarchies’ nor ‘triangles’.
By pure hierarchy, I should mean a serial; system in which face-top-face
relations do not occur between members when they are separated by some
intervening member; in other words, systems in which the only communication
between A and C passes through B. By triangle I should mean a threefold system with
no serial; properties.
The ternary system, parent-nurse-child, on the other hand, is very different from
either of these other two forms. It contains serial elements, but face-to-face
contact does occur between the first and third members. Essentially, the
function of the middle member is to instruct and discipline the third member in
the forms of behavior which he should adopt in his contacts with the first. The
nurse teaches the child how to behave towards its parents, just as the N. C. O.’
teaches and disciplines the private how he should behave towards officers. In
psychoanalytic terminology, the process of introjection is done indirectly, not
by direct impact of the parental personality upon the child. The face-to-face
contact between the first and third members are, however, very important. We may
refer, in this connection, to the vital daily ritual in the British Army, in
which the officer of the day asks the assembled privates and N. C. O. ’s whether
there are any complaints.
Certainly, any full discussion of the English character ought to allow for
ternary, as well as bipolar patterns.
Symmetrical Motifs
So far, we have considered only what we have called ‘complementary’
patterns of relationship, in which the behavior patterns at one end of the
relationship are different from, but fit in with, the behavior patterns at the
other end (dominance-submission etc.).There exists, however, a whole category
of human interpersonal behavior which does not conform to this description. In
addition to the contrasting complementary patterns, we have to recognize the
existence of a series of symmetrical
patterns, in which people respond to what others are doing by themselves doing
something similar. In particular, we have to consider those competitive
patterns in which individual or group A is stimulated to more of any type of behavior by perceiving more of the same type of
behavior (or greater success in that type of behavior) in individual or group
B.
There is a very profound contrast between
such competitive systems of behavior and complementary dominance-submission
systems- a highly significant contrast for any discussion of national character.
In complementary striving, the stimulus which prompts A to greater efforts is
the relative weakness of B; if we want to make A subside or submit, we ought to
show him that B is stronger than he is. In fact, the complementary character
structure may be summarized by the phrase ‘bully-coward,’ implying a
combination of these characteristics in the personality. The symmetrical
competitive systems, on the other hand, are an almost precise functional
opposite of the complementary. Here the stimulus which evokes greater striving
in A is the vision of the greater strength or striving in B; and, inversely, if
we demonstrate to A that B is really weak, A will relax his efforts.
It is probable that these two contrasting patterns are alike available as
potentialities in all human beings; but clearly, any individual who behaves
both ways at once will risk internal confusion and conflict. In the various
national groups, consequently, different methods of resolving this discrepancy
have developed. In England and in America, where children and adults are subjected
to an almost continuous barrage of disapproval whenever they exhibit the
complementary patterns, they inevitably come to accept the ethics of ‘fair
play.’ Responding to the challenge of difficult, they cannot, without guilt,
kick the underdog. For British morale Dunkirk was a stimulus, not a depressant.
In Germany, on the other hand, the same clichés are apparently lacking, and the
community is chiefly organized on the basis of
a complementary hierarchy in terms of dominance and submission. The
dominance behavior is sharply and clearly developed; yet the picture is not
perfectly clear and needs further investigation. Whether a pure
dominance-submission hierarchy could ever exist as a stable system is doubtful.
It seems that in the case of Germany, the submission end of the pattern is
masked, so that overt submissive behavior is almost as strongly tabooed as it
is in America or England. In place of submission, we find a sort of
parade-ground impassivity.
A hint as to the process by which the submissive role is modified and rendered
tolerable comes to us out of the interviews in a recently begun study of German
life histories. One German subject described how different was the treatment
which he, as a boy, received in his South German home, from that which his
sister received. He said that much more, was demanded of him; that his sister
was allowed o evade discipline; that whereas he was always expected to click
his heels and obey with precision, his sister was allowed much more freedom.
The interviewer at once began to look for intersex sibling jealousy, but the
subject declared that it was a greater honor for a boy to obey. ‘One doesn’t
expect to much from girls,’ he said. ‘What one felt they (boys) should
accomplish and do was very serious, because they had to be prepared for life.’
An interesting inversion of noblesse
oblige.
Combinations of Motifs
Among the complementary motifs, we have mentioned only three-
dominance-submission, exhibitionism,-spectatorship and succorance -dependence –
but these three will suffice to illustrate the sort of variable hypothesis at
which we can arrive by describing character in this hyphenated terminology. [
aggression-passivity, possessive- possessed, agent-tool etc. are other motifs
that require more critical attention that can be attempted in this paper.]
Since, clearly, all three of these motifs occur in all Western cultures, the
possibilities for international difference ae limited to the proportions and
ways in which the motifs are combined. The proportions are likely to be very
difficult to detect, except where the differences are large. We may be sure
ourselves that Germans are more orientated towards dominance –submission than
are Americans, but to demonstrate this certainty is likely to be difficult. To
estimate differences in the degree of development of
exhibitionism-spectatorship, or succorance-dependence in various nations will,
indeed, probably be quite impossible.
If, however, we consider the possible ways in which these motifs may be
combined together, wee find sharp qualitative differences which are susceptible
to easy verification. Let us assume that all three of these motifs are
developed in all relationships in Western cultures, and from this assumption go
onto consider which individual plays
which role.
It is logically possible that in one cultural environment A will be dominant
and exhibitionist, while B is submissive and a spectator; while in another
culture X may be dominant and spectator, while Y is submissive and
exhibitionist.
Examples of this sort of contrast rather easily come to mind. Thus we may note
that whereas the dominant Nazis preen themselves before the people, the czar of
Russia kept his private ballet, and Stalin emerges from seclusion only to
review his troops. We might present the relationship between the Nazi Party and
the people thus:
Party: People:
Dominance
Submission
Exhibitionism
Spectatorship
While the Czar and his ballet would be represented:
Czar:
Ballet:
Dominance Submission
Spectatorship
Exhibitionism
Since these European examples are comparatively unprovable, it is worthwhile at
this point to demonstrate the occurrence of such difference by describing a
rather striking ethnographic difference which has been documented more fully.
In Europe, where we tend to associate succoring behavior with social
superiority, we construct our parent symbols accordingly. Our God, or our king,
is the ‘father’ of his people. In Bali, on the other hand, the gods are the
‘children’ of the people, and when a god speaks through the mouth of a person
in a trance, he addresses anyone who will listen as ‘father.’ Similarly, the
rajah is sajanganga (‘spoilt’ like a
child) by his people. The Balinese, further, are very fond of putting children in the combined
roles of god and dancer; in mythology, the perfect prince is polished and
narcissistic. Thus, the Balinese pattern might be summarized thus:
High Status: Low
Status:
Dependence
Succoring
Exhibitionism
Spectatorship
And this diagram would imply, not only that the Balinese feel dependence and
exhibitionism and superior status go naturally together, but also that a
Balinese will not readily combine succoring with exhibitionism (that is, Bali
completely lacks the ostentatious gift-giving characteristic of many primitive
peoples) or will be embarrassed if
forced by context to attempt such a combination.
Although the analogous diagrams for our Western cultures cannot be drawn with
the same certainty, it is worthwhile to attempt them for the parent-child
relationships in English, American, and German cultures. One extra complication
must, however, be faced; when we look at pat\rent-child relationships instead
of relationships between princes and people, we have to make specific
allowances for the changes in the pattern which occurs as the child grows older.
Succorance-dependence is undoubtedly a dominant motif in early childhood, but
various mechanisms later modify this extreme dependence, to bring about some
degree of psychological independence.
The English upper – and middle-class- patent-child relationship would be represented
diagrammatically thus:
Parents: Children:
Dominance
Submission (modified by ‘ternary’ nurse system)
Succoring
Dependence (dependence habit broken by
separation- children sent to school)
Exhibitionism Spectatorship (
children listen silently at meals)
In contrast with this, the analogous American pattern seems to be:
Parents:
Children:
Dominance (slight) Submission(slight)
Succoring
Dependence
Spectatorship Exhibitionism
And this pattern differs from the English not only in the reversal of the
spectatorship-exhibitionism roles, but also in the content of what is
exhibited. The American child is encouraged by his parents to show off his
independence. Usually the process of psychological weaning is not accomplished
by sending the child away to a boarding school; instead, the child’s
exhibitionism is played off against his independence, until the later is
neutralized. Later, from this beginning in the exhibition of independence, the individual may sometimes
go on in adult life to show off succorance,
his wife and family becoming to some degree his ‘exhibits.’
Though the analogous German pattern probably resembles the American in the
arrangement of the paired complementary roles, certainly it differs from the
American in that the father’s dominance is much stronger and much more
consistent and especially in that the context of the boy’s exhibitionism is
quite different. He is, in fact,
dominated into a sort of heel-clicking exhibitionism which takes the place of overt submissive
behavior. Thus, while in the American character exhibitionism is encouraged by
the parent as a method of psychological weaning, both its function and its
content are for the German entirely different.
Differences of this order, which may be expected in all European nations, are
probably the basis of many of our naïve and often unkind international
comments. The may, indeed, be of considerable importance in the mechanics of
international relations, in as much as an understanding of them might dispel
some of our misunderstandings. To an American eye, the English too often appear
‘arrogant,’ whereas to an English eye the American appears to be ‘boastful.” If
we could show precisely how much truth and how much distortion is present in
these impressions, it might be a real contribution to inter-allied cooperation.
In terms of the diagrams above, the ‘arrogance’ of the Englishman would be due to a combination of dominance
and exhibitionism. The Englishman in a performing role (the parent at breakfast,
the newspaper editor, the political spokesman, the lecturer, or what not) assumes
that he is also in a dominant role –that he can decide in accordance with the
vague, abstract standards what sort of performance to give – and the audience
can ‘take it or leave it.” His own arrogance he sees either as ‘natural’ or as
mitigated by his humility in the face of abstract standards. Quite unaware that
his behavior could conceivably be regarded as a comment on his audience, he is,
on the contrary, aware only of behaving in the performer’s role, as he
understand s that role. But the American does not see it thus. To him, the
‘arrogant’ behavior of the Englishman appears to be directed against the audience, in which case the
implicit invocation of some abstract standard appears only to add insult to
injury.
Similarly, the behavior which an Englishman interprets as ‘boastful’ in an
American is not aggressive, although the Englishman may feel that he is being
subjected to some sort of invidious comparison. He does not know that, as a
matter of fact, Americans will only behave like this to people who they rather
like and respect. According to the hypothesis above, the ‘boasting’ pattern results
from the curious linkage whereby exhibition of self-sufficiency and
independence is played-off against over-dependence. The American, when he
boasts, is looking for approval of his upstanding independence; but the naïve
Englishman interprets this behavior as a bid for some sort of dominance or
superiority.
In this sort of way, we may suppose that the whole flavor of one national
culture may differ from that of another, and that such differences may be
considerable enough to lead to serious misunderstandings. It is probable,
however, that these differences are not so complex in their nature as to be
beyond the reach of investigation. Hypotheses of the type which we have
advanced could be easily tested, and research on these lines is urgently
needed.
National Character and American Morale
Using the motifs of interpersonal and intergroup relationship as our clues
to national character, we have been able to indicate certain orders of regular
difference which we may expect to find among the peoples who share our Western
civilization. Of necessity, our statements have been theoretical rather than
empirical; still, from the theoretical structure which we have built up, it is
possible to extract certain formulas which may be useful to the builder of
morale.
All these formulas are based upon the general assumption that people will
respond most energetically when the context is structured to appeal to their
habitual patterns of reaction. It is not sensible to encourage a donkey to go
up hill by offering him raw meat, nor will a lion respond to grass.
1) Since all Western nations tend to think and
behave in bipolar terms, we should do well, in building American morale, to
think of our various enemies as a single hostile entity. The distinctions and
gradations which intellectuals might prefer are likely to be disturbing.
2) Since both Americans and English respond most energetically to symmetrical stimuli, we shall be very unwise if we soft-pedal the disasters of war. If our enemies defeat us at any point, that fact ought to be used to the maximum as a challenge and spur to further effort. When our forces have suffered some reverse, our newspapers ought to be in no hurry to tell us that ‘enemy advances have been checked.’
Military
progress is always intermittent, and the moment to strike, the moment when
maximum morale is needed, occurs when ty enemy is solidifying his positon and
preparing the next blow. At such a moment, it is not sensible to reduce the
aggressive energy of our leaders and people by smug reassurance.
3) There is, however, a superficial discrepancy between the habit of
symmetrical motivation and the need to sow self-sufficiency. We have suggested
that the American boy learns to stand on his own feet through those occasions
in childhood when his parents are approving spectators of his self-sufficiency.
Of this diagnosis is correct, it would follow that a certain bubbling up of
self-appreciation is normal and healthy in Americans and is perhaps an
essential ingredient in American independence and strength.
A too literal following of the formula above, therefore, a too great insistence
upon disasters and difficulties, might lead to some loss of energy through
damming up of this spontaneous exuberance. A rather concentrated diet of
‘blood, sweat and tears’ may be good for the English; but Americans, while no
less dependent upon symmetrical; motivation, cannot feel their oats when fed on
nothing but disaster. Our public spokesmen and newspaper editors should never
soft-pedal the fact that we have a man-sized job on our hands, but they will do
well to insist also that America is a man-sized nation. Any sort of attempt to
reassure Americans by minimizing the strength of the enemy must be avoided, but
frank boasts of real success are good.
(4) Because our vision of the peace is a factor in war- making morale, it is worthwhile to ask at once what light the study of national differences may throw upon the problems of the peace table.
WE have to devise a peace treaty (a) such that Americans
and British will fight to achieve it, and (b) such that it will bring out the
best rather than the worst of our enemies. If we approach it scientifically, such
a problem is by no means beyond our skill.
The most conspicuous psychological hurdle to be negotiated, in imagining such a
peace treaty, is the contrast between the British and American symmetrical patterns
and the German complementary pattern, with its taboos on overt submissive
behavior. The allied nations are not psychologically equipped to enforce a
harsh treaty; they might draw up such a treaty, but in six months they would
tire of keeping the underdog down. The Germans, on the other hand, if they see
their role as ‘submissive,’ will not stay down without harsh treatment. We have
seen these considerations applied even to such a mildly punitive treaty as was
devised at Versailles; the allies omitted to enforce it, and the Germans refuse
to accept it. It is, therefore, useless to repeat such dreams as away of
raising our morale now, when we are angry with Germany. To do that would only
obscure the issues in the final settlement.
The incompatibility between the complementary and symmetrical motivation means,
in fact, that the treaty cannot be organized around simple dominance-submissive
motifs; hence we are forced to look for alternative solutions. We must examine,
for example, the motif of exhibitionism-spectatorship – what dignified role is
each of the various nations best fitted to play? – and that of succoring-dependence
– in the starving postwar world, what motivational patterns shall we evoke between
those who give and those who receive food? And, alternatives to these
solutions, we have the possibility of some three-fold structure, within which both
the allies and Germany would submit, not to each other, but to some abstract principle.
* Civilian Morale, edited by Goodwin Watson, The Society for the
Psychological Study of Social Issues, 1942
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