[ The book
is an extensive critique of ‘secular humanism’ and the teleological notion of
history which he represents as a key episteme in the discursive logic of
Colonialism; an elaboration of Adorno’s view that “progressive readings of
history serve as ideological impediments that block progress in the future”
(Amy Allen in The End of Progress
page 5). It is inspired by a qualified rendition of Michel Foucault’
archaeology of self. He references many scholars I did not know or with whom I
am only faintly familiar: Max Scheler, Haydn White ,Michel De Certeau, the
aforementioned Amy Allen and many others including representatives of Shari’a,
Sufism, Kalam: the Islamic philosophical tradition called adab.
Human beings tend to construct in their minds a simple scheme for representing the world themselves which is easily remembered and convenient to use but is sometimes understood better by what it excludes (thoughts, events, concepts, material circumstances) than by what it positively asserts; schemes whose premises remain largely unexamined.
Human beings tend to construct in their minds a simple scheme for representing the world themselves which is easily remembered and convenient to use but is sometimes understood better by what it excludes (thoughts, events, concepts, material circumstances) than by what it positively asserts; schemes whose premises remain largely unexamined.
Representing the entirety of Hallaq ‘s thesis or even giving an adequate
summary within the limitations of what can be reasonably expected in this blog
post is manifestly beyond my powers, however much his work has crystalized my
own thinking on a number of historical and philosophical fronts, and
intersects with other works I am currently reading.
The book is undertaken as a critique, not entirely negative, of Edward Said’s Orientalism. To give readers a general sense of what Hallaq is saying and for a kind of personal memory tool for myself, I have chosen to reproduce a short footnote (number 10) to the 5th and final chapter of the book. At the beginning of part II of that chapter- Refashioning Orientalism- Hallaq writes: ”As I have been arguing, Said’s narrative, reflecting a particular and narrowly defined concept of power and knowledge, claimed to hail from Foucault, remained faithful to the Enlightenment notions of secular humanism and anthropomorphism.”*]
*Said’s humanism is not only “a gesture of resistance and critique,” but also part of a distinctly “secular intellectual tradition that sees in unafraid and unapologetic critiques the path to human freedom.” ( See Said, “Presidential Address 1999: Humanism and Heroism,” in Publications of the Modern Language Association of America [May 2000]: 285-91) Lumping together together and equating “ethnicity and sect” (read political violence) with “tradition” and “religion,” Said insists these are “neither adequate as guides to nor useful as modes” for the humanist in “making sense of history.” (See also Gil Anidjar, “Secularism,” Critical Inquiry [Autumn 2006]:52-77.) Unlike Max Scheler and others ( including Said’s much admired Vico) who allowed religion the possibility of making as much sense of the world as secular humanist dogma, Said dismissed both tradition and religion out of hand. What remains useful for us in Said’s position on humanism is therefore reduced to that “gesture of resistance and critique.” (That his definition here remains confined to “gesture,” as Orientalist and colonial practices were confined to a “style” of domination, betrays much about the depth of his engagement.)Humanism then is never concerned with the problems of an anthropocentric existence, as his Humanism and Democratic Criticism as well as other writings attest.
Even when drawing on Vico, Said argues for taking seriously the philosopher’s stubborn insistence that men forge their own path and make their own destiny (through resistance and critique, and perhaps through striving). Yet, Said does not appropriate, and in effect entirely excludes, Vico’s idea of the central importance of religion and providence to society, a ‘Scandalous” “detail” that would perhaps tarnish, in Said’s mind, Vico’s image as an advocate of “human freedom”. Unlike Vico, and situating himself at the center-right of the Enlightenment, Said saw contradiction between religion and freedom, a contradiction resolved by secular humanism. On some aspects of Vico’s “scandalous” thought, see Robert C. Minor, Vico: Genealogist of Modernity (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002).
The book is undertaken as a critique, not entirely negative, of Edward Said’s Orientalism. To give readers a general sense of what Hallaq is saying and for a kind of personal memory tool for myself, I have chosen to reproduce a short footnote (number 10) to the 5th and final chapter of the book. At the beginning of part II of that chapter- Refashioning Orientalism- Hallaq writes: ”As I have been arguing, Said’s narrative, reflecting a particular and narrowly defined concept of power and knowledge, claimed to hail from Foucault, remained faithful to the Enlightenment notions of secular humanism and anthropomorphism.”*]
*Said’s humanism is not only “a gesture of resistance and critique,” but also part of a distinctly “secular intellectual tradition that sees in unafraid and unapologetic critiques the path to human freedom.” ( See Said, “Presidential Address 1999: Humanism and Heroism,” in Publications of the Modern Language Association of America [May 2000]: 285-91) Lumping together together and equating “ethnicity and sect” (read political violence) with “tradition” and “religion,” Said insists these are “neither adequate as guides to nor useful as modes” for the humanist in “making sense of history.” (See also Gil Anidjar, “Secularism,” Critical Inquiry [Autumn 2006]:52-77.) Unlike Max Scheler and others ( including Said’s much admired Vico) who allowed religion the possibility of making as much sense of the world as secular humanist dogma, Said dismissed both tradition and religion out of hand. What remains useful for us in Said’s position on humanism is therefore reduced to that “gesture of resistance and critique.” (That his definition here remains confined to “gesture,” as Orientalist and colonial practices were confined to a “style” of domination, betrays much about the depth of his engagement.)Humanism then is never concerned with the problems of an anthropocentric existence, as his Humanism and Democratic Criticism as well as other writings attest.
Even when drawing on Vico, Said argues for taking seriously the philosopher’s stubborn insistence that men forge their own path and make their own destiny (through resistance and critique, and perhaps through striving). Yet, Said does not appropriate, and in effect entirely excludes, Vico’s idea of the central importance of religion and providence to society, a ‘Scandalous” “detail” that would perhaps tarnish, in Said’s mind, Vico’s image as an advocate of “human freedom”. Unlike Vico, and situating himself at the center-right of the Enlightenment, Said saw contradiction between religion and freedom, a contradiction resolved by secular humanism. On some aspects of Vico’s “scandalous” thought, see Robert C. Minor, Vico: Genealogist of Modernity (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002).
[Thus, Said
stands INSIDE the Orientalist/Colonial discourse rather than holding a
recognizably critical position from OUTSIDE it. This Hallaq puts down to Said’s
disinterest in Islam except in its modern expressions, already overcome by the
penetration of Colonial ideology with its genocidal implications not only for
the destruction of traditional societies, mass murder but the fate of the
planet from an ecological point of view.
Despite the limits of Said’s point of view, he did open the door for
discussion and, indeed, inspired a whole cottage industry within the academic
professions, the contradictions and struggles thus engendered giving rise in a
dialectical fashion to the penetrating insights found in Hallaq’s book and of
which he is completely aware.
The author asserts that Europe and America colonized themselves first, then expanded their project of enlightened progress, coupled with the ‘imperatives’ of capitalist economy to the rest of the world. The material, technical, scientific means and modes by which the colonial project advanced represent a potent force determining the epistemological schemes with which modern people explain the world to themselves. The author sees the entire academic establishment, in one way or another with exception, as a sort of handmaiden to Colonialism, even when it declares its opposition because no “world view” ( another simplified scheme that can only be a kind of short hand), no matter how monopolistic, can appear plausible without an opposition. As long as that opposition receives a reasonable share of the benefits of colonialism- getting money and a degree of dominant status, they will not seek to overthrow the larger sovereignty in which they are entombed.
The notion that genocide inheres in the teleology of the enlightened cults of progress even at the level of the ordinary college professor and those of his or her students that might be identified as belonging to the ‘resistance’ is bound to be controversial, not simply on account of the various limited or expanded definitions of ‘genocide’ that can be put forward, including the various moral arguments as they might be applied to human intentionality. Results matter, never-the-less, and the specter of the extinction of the entire human race under the impact of climate change is not to be denied. The promised, gradual extinction of folks resistant to ‘compelling’ arguments of liberal secularists by a demographic flood of diverse ethnic identities, women and youth is a possible example of the genocidal instincts in the habitus of the American Polity.]
The author asserts that Europe and America colonized themselves first, then expanded their project of enlightened progress, coupled with the ‘imperatives’ of capitalist economy to the rest of the world. The material, technical, scientific means and modes by which the colonial project advanced represent a potent force determining the epistemological schemes with which modern people explain the world to themselves. The author sees the entire academic establishment, in one way or another with exception, as a sort of handmaiden to Colonialism, even when it declares its opposition because no “world view” ( another simplified scheme that can only be a kind of short hand), no matter how monopolistic, can appear plausible without an opposition. As long as that opposition receives a reasonable share of the benefits of colonialism- getting money and a degree of dominant status, they will not seek to overthrow the larger sovereignty in which they are entombed.
The notion that genocide inheres in the teleology of the enlightened cults of progress even at the level of the ordinary college professor and those of his or her students that might be identified as belonging to the ‘resistance’ is bound to be controversial, not simply on account of the various limited or expanded definitions of ‘genocide’ that can be put forward, including the various moral arguments as they might be applied to human intentionality. Results matter, never-the-less, and the specter of the extinction of the entire human race under the impact of climate change is not to be denied. The promised, gradual extinction of folks resistant to ‘compelling’ arguments of liberal secularists by a demographic flood of diverse ethnic identities, women and youth is a possible example of the genocidal instincts in the habitus of the American Polity.]
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