[ Historian Per Anders Rudling traces the rise of Ukrainian right-wing party Svoboda from the nationalist myth-making of the post-Soviet diaspora and former President Yushchenko to the political polarization of the nation under now-ousted President Yanukovich.]
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Let's begin with Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper's version. One can think what one likes about deposed Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich, but his election in 2012 was recognized as legitimate by international observers and, after a certain hesitation, by the defeated candidate, Yulia Timoshenko. In fact, relatively honest elections were just about the only positive outcome for ordinary people of the last big mobilization on Maidan Square, the "Orange Revolution" of December 2004.
Presidential elections were set for March 2015, and moved up
to December 2014 by the abortive agreement signed on February 21, signed by
Yanukovich and the parliamentary opposition.
Polls predicted defeat for Yanukovich.
And despite the corruption that characterized his regime, it tolerated a
good measure of political freedom. Among
other things, much of the mass media was in the camp of the opposition.
As for the immediate issue, the Agreement of Association
with the European Union, polls showed that the population was divided. From that point of view, it is the attempt to
impose the Agreement "from the street" that appears as undemocratic. A democratic demand would have been for a
free public discussion, followed by a referendum.
The Provisional Government
As for the provisional government that is now in power,
although it was ratified by Parliament, this was in fact done in violation of
the constitution, which requires a 75 percent vote to impeach a president. No such vote was held. Moreover, at the present moment Olexander
Turchinov is combining the post of Speaker of Parliament with that of President
of Ukraine, a concentration of vast power that goes well beyond anything
allowed for in the constitution. This
does not augur well for the fairness of the coming presidential elections.
That said, it is clear that the tens, and at times hundreds,
of thousands who filled Maidan Square were moved by the desire to end the
pervasive corruption of the political system (and that penetrates most
non-state institutions). The protesters
want to establish popular control of the government and to orient its policy in
the interests of the people.
That movement is characteristic of the present period which
has seen a series of similar popular uprisings -- in the Arab countries, but
also in the former Soviet territory (Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, and
Kirgizstan 2005). An atomized population
is fed up with the political regime. It
mobilizes through the social media, but without a clear program. The fruits of the mass mobilization are then
reaped by forces that are organized and that have a clear program.
The underlying condition of this phenomenon in Ukraine is
the absence of an influential left, which, in its turn, reflects the current
weakness of the working class, the traditional base of the left. Workers, as workers, were absent from Maidan
(no strike in support of the demonstrations took place), even though most of
the protesters were no doubt employees earning very modest salaries.
For the real problem was not Yanukovich, although his regime
was indeed corrupt and serving interests hostile to the working class. (As for the bloodletting on Maidan, its real
authors are still clouded in mystery.
Some observers, most notably the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia
[hostile to Russia], have suggested that it was organized by the Opposition
itself.) In that, Yanukovich's regime
was really no different from those of his predecessors, including Viktor
Yushchenko, hero of the "Orange Revolution," and before him Leonid
Kuchma, who wanted to bring Ukraine into NATO, and before him, Leonid Kravchuk,
the Communist bureaucrat who spent most of his life fighting Ukrainian
nationalism only to become suddenly the father of independent Ukraine.
The real problem is political and economic systems dominated
by "oligarchs," who manipulate linguistic and cultural divisions to
advance their own interests. And from
that point of view, the recent events have changed nothing. Anyone familiar with Ukrainian politics knows
that there is a constant circulation of political personalities between
government and opposition: the oppositionists of Maidan were yesterday members
or allies of the group in power. That,
by the way, distinguishes the Ukrainian regime from the Russian. The latter is "bonapartist" in the
sense that the executive dominates the oligarchs, even while promoting their
overall economic interests. In Ukraine
the oligarchs dominate the government.
The mobilized but atomized masses seemed incapable of
understanding the real source of the problem and even less of putting forth a
real solution (which would be the socialization of the main levers of the
economy). Most saw in membership in the
European Union -- which, of course, was not being offered -- a magical solution
to corruption and a guarantee of respect for democratic norms.
The lack of a clear analysis and program explains the role
that fascists forces were able to play in the events. These forces rejected any compromise with the
contested government, presenting themselves as unyielding adversaries, not only
of the current leaders, but of the "system" itself. And they call for a "national
revolution." This intransigent
position attracted demonstrators who were aware of the bitter fruits of the
Orange Revolution and who did not understand the real meaning of the proposed
"national revolution."
Fascists Gain Legitimacy
This brings us to the other interpretation: the
"fascist putsch." Even if it
does not translate the complexity of the events, it has some grounding in
reality. One of the three oppositional
parties with whom the European diplomats negotiated the agreement of February
21 was Oleh Tyahnybok, who lead the extreme right-wing Svoboda (Freedom), an
anti-Russian, anti-Semitic party that wants Ukraine for ethnic Ukrainians who
speak Ukrainian (which would thus exclude a little less than half of the
population). Svoboda obtained 12 percent
of the vote in the 2012 parliamentary elections, mainly, but not exclusively,
in the three western provinces, the main centers of militant nationalism.
Until 2005, when Svoboda underwent a certain makeover, the
party bore the name "National-Social" and had as its symbol the
"wolfsangel," emblem of certain Nazi SS units. At various moments during the demonstrations,
one could see the red-black banner of OUN (Organization of Ukrainian
Nationalists) on the stage at Maidan.
OUN collaborated with the German occupation in World War II and
participated in the mass murder of Poles and Jews. Tyahnybok himself was expelled from the
right-wing parliamentary bloc in 2004 for remarks about the
"Jewish-Russian mafia" that was controlling Ukraine. Citing the party's racist and xenophobic
character, in 2012 the European Parliament appealed to the democratic parties
of Ukraine not to associate or form alliances with Svoboda.
Despite that, diplomats from the EU and US saw fit to confer
legitimacy on this party, which is now integrated into the official structures
of the state. Its members now hold
several ministerial portfolios, including that of Vice-Prime Minister, Minister
of Defense, and Prosecutor General (who is responsible for upholding the
constitutions and other laws).
But Svoboda has competition on its right from a much smaller
but more violent group: the Right Sector, which is composed of fascist and
football thugs and led by Dmytro Yarosh, a long-time fascist activist. In the latter days of Maidan, Right Sector
activists, who were armed, contributed to forcing the pace of the situation by
taking over public buildings during the negotiations between Yanukovich and the
parliamentary opposition. They thus
contributed to the blocking of application of the agreement of February 21,
negotiated with the aid of European emissaries, which would have created a
provisional government of national coalition.
At present, members of the Right Sector hold posts in the
Ministry of Internal Affairs, responsible for the police and the internal armed
forces. According to some reports,
Yarosh has become Assistant Secretary of the Council for National Security and
Defense, an organism that advises the President on national-defense
strategy. The Secretary of that Council
is Andriy Parubiy, a longtime far-right activist. Recently, Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk
dismissed three Assistant Ministers of Defense for their refusal to integrate
the Right Sector's armed bands into Ukraine's regular armed forces.
Thus, for the first time since World War II, neo-fascists
hold posts in the national government of a European state. And they do this with the blessing of the
Western democracy.
Right Sector forces have seized government arsenals in the
western regions and are the source of a wave of violence and vandalism that has
swept Ukraine, directed at pro-Russian or left-wing organizations,
personalities, and symbols. Among
others, the headquarters of the Communist Party and the offices of an
anti-fascist organization in Kiev were ransacked. There were failed attempts to burn down the
Kiev home of the head of the Communist Party and a synagogue in
Zaporozhye. In some towns in the west of
Ukraine (for example, Rovno) Right Sector thugs appear to be in control of the
local government.
In sum, although one cannot speak of a "fascist
putsch," fascists forces have emerged from the events with increased
strengthen and legitimacy.
Complex Divisions
It goes without saying that this does not augur well for a
country that is so deeply divided, for a very fragile state that had never
existed until 1991 (except for some months during the Russian civil war). The western provinces were attached joined to
Soviet Ukraine only in 1939 (and reattached in 1944). As for Crimea, which had been part of Russia
since the eighteenth century, Moscow presented it as a gift to Ukraine in
1954. If the nationalists reject the
Soviet past as illegitimate -- and they are calling for lustration -- they
should logically be prepared to give up Crimea.
Instead, Svoboda's program calls for the abolition of Crimea's
autonomy. The party also wants to
reintroduce ethnicity in identity documents.
(A prominent member of Svoboda even proposed to make the use of Russian
a criminal offense.)
A situation so fragile would seem to counsel prudence to
genuine patriots of Ukraine. But the
nationalists, who are a minority in the country, want to impose their will on
the others by force. One of the first
acts of Parliament after Yanukovich took flight was to rescind the law that
allowed certain regions to make Russian a second official language, though
subordinate to Ukrainian. This decision
was soon annulled by the government, but the damage was done. Polls indicate that a strong majority
believes that Russian should be recognized as a second official language. Somewhat less than half the population uses
it as their everyday language.
Parliament's actions help to understand the reaction to the new
government in Crimea, largely Russian-speaking and ethnically Russian.
The government that was formed in the wake of Maidan is thus
anything but a government of national unity, as envisioned by the February 21
Accord, which was aimed at reassuring the Russian-speaking population of the
eastern and southern regions. Of the 19
ministers in the new government, only two come from the east, none from the
south. Besides the language question, it
has introduced a resolution to outlaw the Communist Party, which took 13
percent of the vote in 2012 and is, in fact, the only remaining oppositional
party after the Party of Regions fell apart.
In several western provinces, where the legislatures are operating
independently of Kiev, the Communist Party and the Party of Regions have been
declared illegal.
Ukraine's divisions are very deep and complex. Besides language, there is culture, in
particular historical memory. The heroes
of the western provinces collaborated with the German occupation and
participated in its crimes; the heroes of the east and south fought fascism and
for the Soviet Union. There are also
economic interests: the eastern part of the country, the most industrial, is
closely integrated with Russia, by far Ukraine's biggest trading partner. There are also more subtle cultural
differences, which are beyond the scope of this article. But one thing is clear -- the population of
the western provinces, driven by anti-Russian nationalism, is more easily
mobilized. A significant part of the
protesters on Maidan came from those provinces.
The American and EU Interventions
A few words in conclusion on the international actors. Many will recall the conversation between
Victoria Nuland, US Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, and the US
ambassador in Kiev, Geoffrey Pyatt. The
media focused on her saying that the UE could "fuck off." Much less prominence was given to that part
of the conversation that should have really shocked: a discussion of the
composition of the government that would follow Yanukovich's ouster. Nuland definitely wanted to have
"Yats" as head of the government.
And, behold, Yatsenyuk is today Ukraine's Prime Minister. Surely, a mere coincidence.
One could also see Nuland during the demonstrations
distributing bread on Maidan to the protesters.
Imagine the reaction of the Canadian government to the Russian
ambassador distributing donuts to student protesters during Quebec's
"Maple Spring." There is a
difference, to be sure (as the West and the media claim without irony): when
Western diplomats intervene in the internal affairs of foreign countries they
do so to promote democracy and defend the people of those countries. . .
Given the deep internal divisions of Ukraine, its history,
its geography, its economy, it seems obvious that the most suitable
international stance would be one of neutrality, like that of Finland or
Sweden. Polls indicate that 80 percent
of the population opposes membership in NATO.
Yet all presidents up until Yanukovich pursued membership in NATO. Yanukovich was the first to embrace a policy
of neutrality. But NATO will not hear of
that.
We do not know why Yanukovich suddenly suspended
negotiations on the Association Accord.
He did not reject it outright. If
he did it under pressure from Moscow, it is not clear why Putin waited so long
to apply it, since, had he done it earlier, he could have avoided the mass
protest. After all, Yanukovich's party
adopted the goal of an accord back in 2008.
It seems probable that Yanukovich himself changed his mind, fearing the
negative impact on Ukraine's economy (which is in very bad shape, as it has
been more or less since independence in 1991).
The EU was offering a mere 600 million euros to be paid in tranches
dependent on "structural reforms," that is, on a policy of austerity
applied to a population among which poverty is already very widespread. Moreover, Ukraine would have to remove all
commercial barriers and duties for goods and services coming from Europe and to
align its legislation and regulations with those of Europe. That would have had devastating consequences
for Ukraine's industry, located mainly in the east. And what in return? Neither free entry into Europe for its
citizens nor membership in the European Union.
Yanukovich seems to have taken fright.
But not "Yats," who has promised Ukrainians "painful
measures."
Remember Yugoslavia.
It was after IMF-imposed reforms that the separatist movements really
took off. An austerity policy would be
devastating for the Ukrainian population and reinforce unhealthy and
centrifugal tendencies.
The Russian View
How do things appear from the Russian side? The Russian government no doubt sees what has
happened as another step in the longstanding policy of the US and NATO to
contain Russia's influence to her own borders, this despite the solemn
commitment George Bush made to Gorbachev not to expand NATO in return for
German reunification. From the Russian
point of view, it is another use of the tactic of manipulation of popular
mobilizations, used successfully in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine, to bring
about regime change.
Besides that, for purely domestic reasons, Putin cannot
remain indifferent to the rise of an extreme anti-Russian right in a region
with which Russia has close cultural and historic ties. The foreign policy of his authoritarian,
corrupt, and largely incompetent regime is about the only thing that attracts
positive support from the population.
It isn't surprising, then, that Russia has frozen its offer
of $15 billion in loans to Ukraine, an offer made, be it noted, without
austerity conditions. The government has
also announced it will not renew its discount on the price of gas. And Russia has many other economic levers at
its disposal. Russia is Ukraine's
leading trading partner and already threatened to impose punitive tariffs on
certain goods when the European accord was being discussed.
Russia's military moves in Crimea appear to be pursuing
primarily symbolic goals aimed at its own population as well as at Kiev's
right-wing government, which is being warned not be get carried away. As for Western indignation, one should recall
the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, a flagrant violation of international law (such
as it is), under the invented pretext of a threatened genocide of the
Kosovars. Or the illegal invasion of Iraq
justified by imaginary weapons of mass destruction. And dozens of other illegal interventions in
Latin America and the world over.
The words of the last US ambassador to the USSR can provide
a fitting conclusion: "Because of its history, geographical location, and
both natural and constructed economic ties, there is no way Ukraine will ever
be a prosperous, healthy, or united country unless it has a friendly (or, at
the very least, non-antagonistic) relationship with Russia." Contrary to the will of the majority
Ukrainians, NATO rejects that position out of hand.
David Mandel teaches political science at the Université du
Québec à Montréal and has been involved in labor education in the Ukraine for
many years.
Monthly Review Magazine 13.03.14
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