George Alexander Kubler (26 July 1912 - 3 October 1996) was
an American art historian and among the foremost scholars on the art of
Pre-Columbian America and Ibero-American Art. This book was published in 1962
by Yale University.
I include this brief selection in my blog because it
describes (though it does not directly refer to) in fairly certain terms the premise of the Deconstructive Project
(e.g. the works of Jacques Derrida) and of Continental Philosophy as it might
be compared to the American Analytic and Pragmatic philosophical traditions.
What he says should at least provoke a note of suspicion with respect to convictions and conventions of popular
history as agonizingly displayed on a daily basis by our benighted political
classes and their lapdogs in the media; and perhaps serve as an encouragement
to humility for those of us struggling to, as it were, turn the tide of current
affairs.
Le passe ne sert qu'a connaitre l'actualité. Mais
l'actualité m'echappe. Qu'est-ce que c'est donc que l'actualite?
[The past only serves to know the news. But the news escapes
me. What therefore is actuality?]
For years this question – the final and capital question of
his life- obsessed my teacher Henri Focillon, especially during the black days
from 1940 to 1943 when he died in New Haven.
The question has been with me ever since, and I am now no closer to the
solution of the riddle, unless it be to suggest that the answer is a negation.
Actuality is when the lighthouse is dark between flashes: it
is the instant between the ticks of a watch: it is a void interval slipping
forever through time: the rupture between the past and future: the gap at the poles
of the revolving magnetic field, infinitesimally small but ultimately
real. It is the interchronic pause when
nothing is happening. It is the void between events.
Yet the instant of actuality is all we ever can know
directly. The rest of the time emerges only in signals relayed to us at this
instant by innumerable stages and by unexpected bearers. One may ask why these
old signals- stored like kinetic energy until the moment of notice when the mass
descends along some portion of its path to the center of the gravitational
system- are not actual.
The nature of a signal
is that its message is neither here or now, but there and then. If it is a
signal it is past action, no longer embraced by the “now” of present being. The
perception of the signal happens “now,” but its impulse and transmission happened
“then.” In any event, the present instant is the plane upon which the signals
of all being are projected. No other plane of duration gather us up universally
into the same instant of becoming.
Our signals from the past are very weak, and our means for
recovering their meaning are most imperfect. Weakest and least clear of all are
those signals coming from the initial and terminal moment of any sequence in
happening, for we are unclear about our ideas of a coherent portion of time.
The beginnings are much hazier than the endings, where at least the
catastrophic action of external events can be determined. The segmentation of
history is still an arbitrary and conventional matter, governed by no
verifiable conception of historical entities and their duration. Now and in the
past, most of the time the majority of people live by borrowed ideas and upon
traditional accumulations, yet at every moment the fabric is being undone and a
new one is woven to replace the old, while from time to time the whole pattern
shakes and quivers, settling into new shapes and figures. These processes of
change are all mysterious uncharted regions where the traveler soon loses
directions and stumbles into darkness. The clues to guide us are very few
indeed: perhaps the jottings and sketches of architects and artists, put down
in the heat of imagining a form or the manuscript brouillons of poets and musicians, crisscrossed with erasures and
corrections, are the hazy coastlines of this dark continent of the “now,” where
the impress of the future is received by the past.
To other animals who live more by instinct than do humans,
the instant of actuality must seem far less brief. The rule of instinct is
automatic, offering fewer choices than intelligence, with circuits that close
and open unselectively. In this duration
choice is so rarely present that the trajectory from past to future describes a
straight line rather than the infinitely bifurcation system of human
experience. The ruminant or the insect must live time as an extended present
which endures as long as the individual life, while for us, the single life
contained an infinity of present instants, each with its innumerable open
choices in volition and in action.
Why should actuality forever escape our grasp? The universe
has a finite velocity which limits not
only the spread of its events, but also the speed of our perceptions. The
moment of actuality slips too fast by the slow, coarse net of our senses. The
galaxy whose light I see now may have ceased to exist millenia ago, and by the
same token men cannot fully sense any event cosmic storm which we all the
present, and which perpetually rages throughout creation.
In my own present, a thousand concerns of active business
lie unattended while I write these words. The instant admits only one action
while the rest of possibility lies unrealized. Actuality is the eye of the storm:
it is a diamond with an infinitesimal perforation through which the ingots and
billets of present possibility are drawn into past events. The emptiness of
actuality can be estimated by the possibilities that fail to attain realization
in any instant: only when they are few can actuality seem full.
Historical knowledge consists of transmissions in which the
sender, the signal, and the receiver all are variable elements affecting the
stability of the message. Since the receiver of a signal becomes its sender in
the normal course of historical transmission (e.g. the discoverer of a document
usually is its editor), we may treat receivers and senders together under the heading
of relays. Each relay is the occasion of some deformation in the original
signal. Certain details seem insignificant and they are dropped in the relay;
others have an importance conferred by their relationship to events occurring
in the moment of the relay, and so they are exaggerated. One relay may wish for
reasons of temperament to stress the traditional aspects of a signal; another
will emphasize their novelty. Even the historian subjects his evidence to these
strains, although he strives to recover the pristine signal.
Each relay willingly or unwillingly deforms the signal according
to his own historical position. The relay transmits a composite signal,
composed only in part of the message as it was received, and in part of
impulses contributed by the relay itself. Historical recall never can be
complete nor can it be even entirely correct, because of the successive relays
that deform the message.
The conditions of the transmission of signals nevertheless
are not so defective that historical knowledge is impossible. Actual events
always excite strong feelings, which the initial, message usually records. A series of relays
may result in the gradual disappearance of the animus excited by the event. The
most hated despot is the live despot: the ancient despot is only a case
history. In addition, many objective residues or tools of the historian’s
activity, such as chronological tables of events, cannot easily be deformed.
Other examples are the persistence of certain religious expressions through
long periods and under great deforming pressures. The rejuvenation of myths is
a case in point: when an ancient version becomes unintelligibly obsolete a new
version, recast in contemporary terms, performs the same old explanatory
purposes.
The essential condition of historical knowledge is that the
event should be within range, that some signal should prove past existence.
Ancient time contains vast durations without signals of any kind that we can
now receive. Even the events of then past few hours are sparsely documented,
when we consider the ratio of events to their documentation. Prior to 3000 B.C.
the texture of transmitted duration disintegrates more and more the farther we
go back. Though finite, the total number of historical signals greatly exceeds
the capacity of any individual or group to interpret all the signals in all their
meaning. A principle aim of the historian therefore is to condense the
multiplicity and the redundancy of his signals by using various schemes of
classification that will spare us the tedium of reliving the sequence in all
its instantaneous confusion . .
For the most part the craft of history is concerned with the
elaboration of credible messages upon the simple foundations afforded by primary
signals- meaning evidence closest to the event itself- though this may require
a great expense of energy for its detection and interpretation (e.g. an
archeologist tracing a buried floor level with his assistants spends about the
same energy upon reading the signal as the original builders put into the floor
in the first instance). More complex messages have widely varying degrees of
credibility. Some are fantasies existing in the minds of the interpreters
alone. Others are rough approximations to the historical truth, such as those
reasonable explanations of myths called euhemerist (holding that many
mythological tales can be attributed to historical persons and events, the
accounts of which have become altered and exaggerated over time.)
Still other complex messages are probably stimulated by
special primary signals of which our understanding is incomplete. These ( such
as is found in Spengler and other hypothesis proposed under the rubric of ‘social
Darwinism) arise from extended durations and from large units of geography and population;
they are complex, dimly perceived signals which have little to do with
historical narrative. Only certain new statistical methods come near to
detection . . .
The survival of antiquity has perhaps commanded the
attention of historians mainly because the classical tradition has been superseded,
because it is no longer a live water; because we are now outside it, and not
inside it. We care no longer borne by it as in a current upon the sea: it is
visible to us from a distance and in perspective only as a major part of the topography
of history. By the same token we cannot clearly descry the contours of the
great currents of our own time: we are too much inside the streams of
contemporary happening to chart their flow and volume. We are confronted with
inner and outer historical surfaces. Of these only the outer surfaces of the
completed past are accessible to historical knowledge