Friday, December 31, 2021

Growing the Fields of Historical-Philological Understanding by Kurt Flasch

 
Meister Eckhart and His Students; This Transfiguration is the last painting by Raffael commissioned by Cardinal Giulo de Medici, conceived as an alterpiece for the  Narbonne Catherdral in France (1520)
 

When the anarchical socialist Gustav Landauer (1870-1919) insulted Emperor Wilhelm II and was sent to prison in Berlin-Tegel for lese-majeste, he spent his time translating parts of Meister Eckhart’s Middle High German works. He did not get to see them in print; he was a member of the Munich Soviet Republic and was kicked to death in prison after its suppression. In 1920, Martin Buber published them in Berlin as Meister Eckharts Mystische Schriften: In usere Sprache ubertragen von Gustav Landauer. In the first sentence of his preface, Landauer declares, ‘ I will leave out everything that does not make sense to us. Meister Eckhart is too precious for historical evaluation; he has to been resurrected as a living human being.’

Many interpreters of Eckhart have thought similarly, but not many were able to couch their anti-historicism in such grand terms: Eckhart – ‘to precious’ for historical evaluation – to be ‘resurrected’ as a living human being. I take these flashy expressions as a starting point for thinking about the preconditions of historical knowledge. For someone who decides that certain parts of Eckhart’s works ‘do not make sense to us’ lays claim to historical knowledge, even if he calls it something else and even if he does not consider his work on Eckhart ‘historical.’ What matters here are not disciplinary affiliations but the fact that Eckhart died in 1328 and that mediation between his texts and us is unavoidable.

 

Everyone who speaks about Eckhart produces just such historical knowledge in his present and under present conditions. Eckhart does not simply spill over into the present from ‘sources’ in the past. He is identified, constructed, and evaluated under the conditions of the present. No one simply crosses over into the past. The epistemological capabilities, interests, and constraints of the present shape the image of Eckhart that we create for ourselves. Some authors attempt to draw Eckhart directly into their present. They aim to ‘resurrect him,’ but that seems to go beyond human capabilities – at least my own. Eckhart is dead and thus is an object of historical knowledge. Someone who speaks and writes about him is well advised to let us know who is determining the criteria according to which something ‘makes sense’ to ‘us’.  Only then will he think about how much his present predetermines the nature of his historical knowledge, and if his interest in Eckhart is genuine, he will want to use all his available options for acquiring knowledge.

Much of our present, of course, can distract us from Eckhart or obscure him. Yet one of the advantages of the present is the speed with which new source material that expands our image of the constellation of intellectual life around 1300 is made available. Today, we have a better understanding of the conditions of study within the Dominican order and the intellectual debates at Paris than we did fifty years ago – for example, through the continual editions of the works of influential teachers such as Albertus Magnus of Cologne and Henry of Ghent. An account of Eckhart’s thinking must not be limited to identificatory paraphrases of individual ideas and motifs. It requires a focus on Eckhart’s ideas, but at the same time, every reader of Eckhart who really wants t get to know him has first go out into the wide, growing field of historical-philological details.

Within the past decades, four initiatives have improved our understanding of Eckhart’s thoughts:

First, the edition and analysis of sermon cycle of German sermons by Georg Steer. Steer made the unity and previously contested authenticity of these sermons plausible.

Second, Loris Sturlese discovery of the Eckhart manuscript at Oxford has improved the quality of important texts among Eckhart’s Latin works. Sturlese also rewrote the chronology of Eckhart’s Latin works on the basis of a painstaking examination of the Eckhart manuscripts at Erfurt.

Third, Loris Sturlese edition and analysis of Eckhart’s trial records shed new light on  this last phase of Eckhart’s life and thought.

Fourth, the editors of the Corpus Philosophorum Teuonicorum  Medii Aevi made Eckhart’s intellectual milieu accessible. It used to be fashionable to cloak Eckhart in the pathos of lofty solitude; nowadays, we can prove that he had connections to others. We find both similarities and stark contrasts between Eckhart and his contemporaries or his Dominican teachers. Studies of his theoretical position within the German order’s province have received new impetus in the past decades. New texts are constantly being published. A unified picture of the debates will be possible only after a series of specialized studies. There were German followers and adversaries of both Dietrich and Eckhart.

We could argue that someone who has drunk the living juice of the intellectual and linguistic power of an Eckhart or Plato or Kant need not bother with the odds and ends of historical and philosophical detail. But we should remind ourselves that what is considered essential, the poetic-philosophical substrate of Plato’s texts, or Eckhart’s or Kant’s, is controversial and continually being reinterpreted. Not fixed, it is in continual motion, and seemingly small details –dates, manuscript finds, and new biographical data – can all cause significant ripples.

 

Our knowledge or ignorance of certain facts can change our understanding of the basic tenets of earlier philosophers. A failed or successful incorporation of new facts into our commonly held assumptions corrects or conserves certain schools of thought. Without them, subjective appropriations will never experience a corrective; the confident pathos of having captured the essence once and for all remains intact; speech that shuns facts trickles away, vague and imprecise. What previous readings of Eckhart often lack are linguistic discipline, semantic specification, and a philological basis . . .

Evens small advances within philology and history have consequences. All texts even the Bible and even Eckhart’s, are situated within a specific historical context and have to be read and analyzed carefully within that context. Such a proper historical reading by itself is not enough, but it is the only way to avoid wild speculation, mere subjective appropriations, exploitation of the author in behalf of the church or in anti-ecclesiastical contexts, all of which abound within scholarly interpretations of Eckhart.



 

Thursday, December 30, 2021

The Essence of Stylistic Appeal by Kenneth Burke



 

In its simplest manifestation, style is ingratiation. It is an attempt to gain favor by the hypnotic or suggestive process of ‘saying the right thing.’ Obviously it is most effective when there is an agreement as to what the right thing is. A plain spoken people will distrust a man, bred to different ways of statement, is overly polite and deferential with them and tends to put his commands in the form of questions (saying ‘Would you like to do this? when he means ‘Do this’) They may even suspect him of ‘sneakiness.’ He, conversely, may consider their blunt manner a bit boastful, even at times when they are most consumed with humility. The ways by which the mannered speaker would ingratiate himself with mannered listeners, or the plain-spoken one with blunt listeners, may thus become style gone wrong when the groups cross.

I have seen men, themselves schooled in the experience of alcohol, who knew exactly how to approach a drunken man, bent on smashing something, quickly act upon him by such phrases and intonations as were ‘just right’ for diverting his fluid suggestibility into the channel of maudlin good fellowship. The very rawness of the accomplishment reveals the process most clearly. Here was a style or ingratiation successfully employed by a poet to produce a desire state of mind in his audience. I should have hated to see a Mathew Arnold tackle the job. He would have been too crude – his training would have been all incapacity. Even in America today (1938), despite our mobility, one may come upon local sequences of statement and rejoinder, a rigidly observed pattern of remarks, gestures and tonalities, which are repeated almost detail by detail whenever neighbors meet. Surely this is not mere psittacism [parroting], but a stylistic formula, away of establishing mutual ingratiation by the saying of right things.

Etiquette is French for label. Larousse says that is put on bottles, boxes, sacks to indicate contents, the price etc. Its derived meaning is, of course, court ceremony and ceremonious forms. Thus, obviously, the more homogeneous a society’s ways of living and doing and thinking are, the more homogeneous will be the labels, hence the greater likelihood the artists will use these labels to their purposes.

When Emily Post sold many hundred  thousand copies of her book between the New Era years of 1925 and 1929, you can confidently look in your literature for a corresponding ‘problem of style,’ There will be forlorn Mathew Arnolds attempting to calm drunkard s by reference to labels almost ludicrously inadequate. There will be tough, hard-boiled work which does manifest the tact of experience, does use the adequate labels required for producing the desired hypnosis under the circumstances. There will be the superficial attempt to establish asset of labels by fiat; the literature of forced sentiments and hothouse elegances, or of such quick allegiances that a proletarian movement in art can arise over night.

Of course, when used by a fertile and ebullient poet, the business of appeal by saying the right things becomes a highly adventurous pursuit. Shakespeare gives some indication how wide the range of conformity may be. In Julius Caesar, for instance,, we see him establish his conspirators as conspirators by the bluntest kinds of label. One plucks at another’s sleeve, they whisper, they feign goodwill, they meet during storms and in the miasmal darkness of night. In King Lear, the ingredients of such a character as Cordelia point to a subtler kind of ingratiation. Shakespeare first shows us how grossly she is misunderstood. Now, who among his audience was not both well-meaning and misunderstood? Hence, who among them did not open his heart to Cordelia, as the further purposes of the playwright made necessary? DeQuincey, commenting on Macbeth, reminds us that Shakespeare may still go deeper. When he has finished depicting Macbeth’s murder of the King, and lets us hear a sinister knock at the gate, has he not her intermingled internal and external events, by objectifying something so private as the harsh knock of conscience, thereby implicating us in the murder not merely as witnesses, but as participants? It will; thus be seen that the use of labels is no obsequious matter, but is best managed by the boldest minds.

It will also be seen that insofar as the structure of these labels is impaired, their serviceability for communicative purposes is correspondingly impaired. One does not hypnotize a man by raising a problem- one hypnotizes him by ringing the bells of his response. Change, heterogeneity of occupation and instability of expectation have a radical bearing upon the range, quality, and duration of such linkages. Add geographical shifts, breakdown of former social stratification, cultural mergers, introduction of ‘new matter’ – and you have so many further factors to affect the poetic medium adversely. The people’s extreme delight in the acting of Charlie Chaplin was probably due to the way in which his accurate mimetic style could surmount the social confusion. His expressions possessed an almost universal significance, since they were based upon the permanent certainties of the body, the eternal correlations between mental attitude and bodily posture.

Various Romantic Solutions

Some poets met the problem  by observing once more the old linkages under glass. They recalled the ancient Mediterranean lore. Like Anatole France, with a mixture of melancholy and irony, they ‘scribbled’ in the margins of books. Others wrote for the elect, a vague quantity X of a public who disliked the entire trend of events, and wished to have their dislike confirmed by an aggressive symbolization of better worlds. Closely connected to these were the writers who harkened  unto themselves, to catch the linkages that grew inescapably out of their own individual lives, hoping that there would be enough overlap upon other lives to establish a  bond. Others satirized the jerry-built linkages which the exigencies of the scene were forever establishing overnight, and which were particularly liable to ridicule when judged from the point of view vestigially surviving out of the past. Others socialized their art by quickly conforming with the interests of the season, using a bias while it lasted, selling a war play in war times, a vice play while the papers were full of news about some minister in a scandal with a member of his choir etc. Connected with these, though less opportunistic in their own eyes at least, were the exploiters of new scientific discoveries, who might depict the deadly ravages of syphilis or alcoholism at a time when much talk of heredity was in the air.

Others made various attempts at neo-primitiveness, either going off to live in regions still relatively unaffected by the disturbances of the pro technological West, or else trying to disclose and exploit the new moralities that were spontaneously arising among various groups formerly considered from the standpoint of incapacity rather than from the standpoint of training: toughs, thieves, lumberjacks, whores, fishermen, smugglers, miners, shop girls, bullfighters, etc. Another group of these neo-primitives stressed sexual concerns as the basis of the undeniable and universal.

 

 

Others met the issue by starting from the issue itself: Their art became a methodology of art. Perhaps the most thorough exemplification of this last solution is to be seen in the later works of James Joyce, who has subjected to the linguistic medium to a severe process of disintegration, largely stimulated by researches in the laboratories of psychology. On a trivial plane, a somewhat analogous tendency is to be noted in the elaborate compound puns in which some of our nonsense comedians now specialize, though in their case the stimulus probably arises more indirectly, not from the laboratory, but from the need of reorientation which the many resources of applied science have led to.

But our concept of trained incapacity prompts us to look for the converse of this situation. The dilemmas of poetry must argue the advantages of something else. If one kind of communication breaks down, another kind will thrive on its ruins.

The positivistic side of the situation is to be seen in the development of the technological approach, with its low anthropomorphic content. The very change in the nature of our written vocabulary bears witness to this. The scientific terminology is conceptual, designed for the purpose of naming, whereas spontaneous symbols of communication are horatory, suggestive, hypnotic. It seems no accident that precisely the century which had so greatly confused its intuitive orientation should have developed, to a greater extent than has ever been know before, the conceptual use of language. Its very muddle as regards the subtleties of mimetic and tonal ingratiation would force us to name things rather than respond to them. Even the dominant music of the century became psychologistic, its programmatic genius strongly observable in the blunt onomatopoetic qualities of Berlioz and the flowering in Wagner’s systematic reliance upon musical naming in his use of the leitmotif. The prestige of instruction rose as the prestige of suggestion fell. Style, beauty, form- these now had to be fought for; or where they prevailed, they were largely expended upon eliciting of morbid response, so extreme as still to be unequivocal. Suasion was for cheap politicians, rhetoric became synonymous with falsity, and strict definition became the ideal . . .

 

Footnote on Style

 

Style is a constant meeting of obligations, a state of being without offense, a repeated doing of the ‘right’ thing. It molds our actions by contingencies, but these contingencies go to the farthest reaches of the communicative. For style (custom) is a complex schema of what-goes-with-what, carried through all the subtleties of manner and attitudes. Its ample practice in social relationships can take the place of competitive success because it is success. We tend to think of customary actions as compulsive –yet values exist today only insofar as custom survives. It is not humane to refrain from murder simply because there are laws against murder – no gratifying social relationships could be constructed upon such a basis. Friendship does not enjoy the protection of the courts – it is upheld by styles dictating the obligations which friends feel towards each other. To codify such obligations would be tantamount to repealing them. The normal tendency to refrain from the murder of one’s allies is ‘rational’ only because it reflects an unquestioned taboo, an undeviating sense of what goes with what. And an obedience to such customary values is not cowardice, but piety.

We have suggested many reasons why old systems of piety must be partially abandoned: any important change in the material conditions to which they were adapted is sufficient to throw them in disorder. For in societies greatly marked by class prerogatives, style itself tends to become a competitive implement, as a privileged group may cultivate to advertise its privileges and perpetuate them. Style then ceases to be propitiatory. It becomes boastful. It is no longer a mode of ingratiation, but a device for instilling fear, like the emperor’s insignia. (such fear is generally called respect.) As style assumes this invidious function, there is a corresponding social movement from inducement towards dominance. Its congregational qualities are lessened, its segregational qualities are stressed. Thus such a feudalistic manifestation of style is probably evidence, in the spiritual plane, of maladjustment in the material plane.

‘Fads’ express the need for conformity at a time when opportunities for conformity are of a low order. They are instinctively sound, since they are strongly communicative, but they are far too liquid and superficial to perform fully the pious function. They are the cultural result of the attempts to patch up the inadequacies of custom by profuse and shifty legislation. Legislation is the soundest when it is merely the codification of custom. But when custom becomes inadequate (for one reason or another) we attempt to reverse the process and mold custom by legislative fiat. This reverse process would be particularly dangerous insofar as the legislative mechanism were in control of any special group alone, without regard for the requirements of the community as a whole. At such times legislation becomes doubly ominous. For not only does it tend to ‘liquidate’ customary sanctions, but it attempts to establish new sanctions inimical to the demands of the group as a whole. It thus blocks the effusive purpose by which style can be wholesomely re-synthesized.

 

Saturday, November 27, 2021

Preface to the1957 edition, etc. by Rolland Barthes



The following texts were written one a month for about two years, from 1954 to 1956, in the light (or darkness) of current events. My effort at the time was to reflect regularly on some myths of French daily life. The material prompting such reflections could be quite various (a newspaper article, a photograph in a magazine, a film, a theatrical performance, a gallery exhibit) and their subject quite arbitrary, depending of course on my own interests at the time.

The starting point of these reflections was usually a feeling of impatience with the ‘naturalness’ which common sense, the press, and the arts continually invoke to dress up a reality which, though the one live in, is nonetheless quite historical: in a word, I resented seeing Nature and History repeatedly confused in the description of our reality, and I wanted to expose in the decorative display of what-goes-without-saying the ideological abuse I believed was hidden there.

Right off, the notion of myth seemed to be to account for these phony instances of the obvious; at the time I was using the word in its traditional sense. But I was already operating on one conviction from which I would try to draw all the consequences: myth is a language. Therefore, though concerned with phenomena apparently quite remote from literature (a wrestling match, an elaborately cooked dish, an exhibition of plastic), I had no intention of abandoning the general semiology of our bourgeois world, whose literary aspects I had approached in my previous essays. Yet it was only after having explored a certain number of current nonliterary subjects that I attempted to define contemporary myth in any methodical; way: that text of course I put at the end of this book, since it merely systematizes previous materials.

Written month after month, these essays made no claim to constitute an organic development: what links them together is a matter of insistence, of repetition. Actually I don’t know whether I agree with the proverb  that repeated things give pleasure, but I do know that at least they signify. And what I have sought in everything here are indeed significations. Are they my significations? In other words, is there a mythology of the mythologist? Doubtless there is, and the reader will soon find out where I strand. But to tell the truth, I don’t think that’s the right way to frame the question. ‘Demystification’, to keep using a word that’s showing signs of wear, is not an Olympian Operation. What I mean is, I don’t share the belief that there’s a divorce in nature between the objectivity of the scientist and the subjectivity of the writer, as if the former were endowed with a ‘freedom’ and the latter with a ‘vocation,’ both of them likely to spirit away or sublimate the true limits of their situation: my claim is to live to the full the contradictions of my time, which can make sarcasm the condition of truth.

                                 …………………………..

 

What is enacted by wrestling, then, is an ideal intelligence of things, a euphoria of humanity, raised for a while out of the constitutive ambiguity of everyday situations and installed in a panoramic vision of univocal Nature, in which signs finally correspond to causes without obstacle, without evasion and without contradiction.

 

                          ……………………………..

 

The whole Dominici trial was performed according to a certain idea of psychology, which happens as if by accident to be that of the properties of bourgeois literature. Material proofs being uncertain or contradictory, recourse was had to mental proofs; and where to find these if not in the very mentality of the accusers? Therefore the motives and sequence of actions are reconstructed with a free hand but without the shadow of doubt; a procedure like that of an archaeologists who gather old stones from all over the excavation site, and with their quite modern cement erect a delicate wayside alter to Sesostris, or even construct a religion dead for two thousand years by consulting the remains of universal wisdom, which is in fact only their own wisdom elaborated in the academies of the Third Republic.

Merely to base an archaeological reconstruction or a novel on a ‘Why not?’ harms no one. But Justice? Periodically, some trial, and not necessarily a fictional one like the one in Camus L’Etranger, comes to remind you that Justice is always ready to lend you a spare brain in order to condemn you without a second thought, and that like Corneille it depicts as you ought to be not as you are.

This appearance of Justice in the world of the accused is possible thanks to an intermediary myth, always made good use of by Officialdom, whether the Court of Assizes or literary tribunals: the myth of transparency and the universality of language. The presiding  Assize Judge, who reads Le Figaro, obviously has no scruples about exchanging words with an olds ‘illiterate’ goatherd. Don’t they share the same language, and the clearest one there is, French? Wonderful assurance of  classical education, where shepherds converse with judges without embarrassment! But here, too, behind the prestigious (and grotesque) morality of Latin translations and French essays, a man’s head is at stake.

 

                                   ……………………

 

And I begin to wonder if the lovely and touching iconography of the Abbe Pierre is not the alibi by which a sizable part of the nation  authorizes itself, once again, to substitute the signs of charity for the reality of justice.

                     ……………………………….

The anarchy of customs and of superficial behavior is an excellent alibi for order: individualism is a bourgeois myth which allows us to vaccinate the order and tyranny of class with a harmless freedom: the Batory (800 French touring Russia in 1955)  brought the flabbergasted Russians the spectacle of a glamorous freedom, that of chattering during museum visits and ‘being funny’ in the metro, but there is no question but that ‘individualism’ is a luxury product for export only. In France, and applied to an object of quite different importance, it has, at least for Le Figaro, another name.

When four hundred Air Force veterans, called up for North African service, refed to serve one Sunday, Le Figaro no longer spoke of the sympathetic anarchy and individualism of the French: no longer any question here of museum or metro, but rather of colonial investments and big money; whereupon ‘disorder’ was no longer a phenomena of glorious Gallic virtue, but the artificial product of a few ‘agents’; it was no longer glamorous but lamentable, and the monumental lack of discipline of the French, formerly praised with so many waggish and self-satisfied winks , has become, on the road to Algeria, a shameful treason. Le Figaro knows its bourgeois freedoms out front, on display, but Order back home, a constitutive necessity.

 

                             ……………………………….

(I confess a great predilection for balancing acts, for in them the body is objectified gently; it is not a had object catapulted through the air as in pure acrobatics, but rather a soft, dense substance, responsive to very slight movements.)


                          …………………………….

The anti-intellectualist ideology  affects various political milieus, and it is not necessary to be a Poujadist to nourish a hated of ideas. For what is inculpated here is any form of explicative, committed culture, and what is saved is an ’innocent’ culture, the culture whose naivete leaves the tyrant’s hands free. What is condemned is the intellectual, i.e. consciousness, or better still: an Observation. That no one look at us is the principle of Pujadist anti-intellectualism.

Only, from the ethnologist’s  point of view, the practices of integration and exclusion are obviously complementary, and in a sense which is not the one he supposes, Poujade needs intellectuals, for if he condemns them it is on account of a magical evil: in the Poujadist society the intellectual has the accursed and necessary role of a lapsed witch doctor.


 

Friday, November 19, 2021

The Power of the Saints in Late- Roman Antiquity by Peter Brown


 





The potentia of the saint in his shrine assumed a ‘vertical’ model of dependence. The saint’s power held the individual in a tight bond of personal obligation that might begin, days of hard journey away, in a need to visit the saint’s praesentia (presence) in the one place it could be found; it could make a patient pass through the drama of a late-Roman court scene, and it might even end in a palpable and irreversible act of social dependence, by which the recipient of healing became the serf of the church in which his invisible dominus (master) resided.

By contrast Marcellus* sums up a world for which a ‘horizontal’ model is still dominant: the patient is tied directly by a web of Lilliputian threads to a diffuse and seemingly bottomless traditions of his own environment. Such a model tacitly but firmly excluded the intervention from the outside of a potentia that might dislodge the individual from the environment in which he could still feel safely embedded. Seen in this light, what we call the spread of Christianity in Gaul, as it radiated from those great shrines where the praesentia of the saints was dramatically revealed by acts of power, amounts to a conflict of two models of healing, each heavy with assumptions on the position of man in his society and his environment. It is to this conflict that we now must turn.

For this is the conflict which holds the attention of Gregory of Tours. It is summed up for him in two words: reverentia and its antithesis, rusticitas. Reverentia implied a willingness to focus belief on precise invisible persons, on Christ and his friends the saints – the amici dominici – in such away as to commit the believer to definite rhythms in his life ( such as the observation of the holy days of the saints), to direct his attention to specific sites and objects ( the shrines and the relics of the saints), to react to illness and to danger by dependence on these invisible persons, and to remain constantly aware, in the play of human action around him, that good and bad fortune was directly related to good or bad relations with these invisible persons. Reverentia, therefore, assumed a high degree of social and cultural grooming. It was not a luxuriant undergrowth of credulity or neo-paganism. It involved learning an etiquette towards the supernatural, whose every gesture was carefully delineated. Hence the importance for Gregory of its antithesis, rusticitas, which is best translated as ‘boorishness,’ ‘slipshodness’ – the failure, or the positive refusal, to give life structure in terms of ceremonious relationships with specific invisible persons.

Gregory’s use of the word rusticitas throws light on the position of Christianity in parts of Gaul, and, by implication, in western Europe as a whole, at the end of the late-antique period. It is a situation which requires some delicacy of interpretation. For a sharp dichotomy between ‘town’ and ‘country,’ ‘Christian’ and ‘pagan’ does not do justice to its nuances. Rusticitas, as Gregory observed its ravages, overlapped considerably with the habits of the rural population; but it was by no means limited exclusively to these. Rusticitas could be committed by most people on most days – and especially on Sundays, as when the inhabitants of Arles irrespective of class and culture brought upon themselves the solemn warnings of their bishop, Caesarius, by behaving like rustici in making love to their wives on the Lord’s Day. Still less can it be identified with ‘rural paganism’. For what we have seen is that, although therapeutic systems such as those assumed by Marcellus depended upon knowledge inherited from the pagan past, they formed and intractable enclave of rusticitas less because they were closely connected with any precise forms of pagan worship, as because they tacitly denied any rhythm of cure that involved explicit dependence on the potentia of an invisible human being: the kin, the neighbors, especially the cunning men and women of the locality, were thought to be able to o provide all that the sufferer needed. When members of Gregory’s own entourage, traveling to Brioude to avoid the plague, resorted to the use of amulets applied by local diviners to cue one of their fellows, what angers him is not that they were behaving like pagans, but that they had lost their sense of reverentia for the saints. It provokes in him a characteristic outburst:

Let the patronage of the martyrs be what the sufferer seeks . . . Let him pray for the help offered by the confessors, who are truly called the friends of the Lord..

Thus, in any place where a Christian shrine lay close to hand, the diffuse resources of the neighborhood, as these had been applied in the forms of amulets and divination, were met by a precisely delineated image of ideal human relations sketched out by bishops  such as Gregory with a certainty of touch that betrayed the long grooming of late-Roman aristocratic society.

It is in a conflict of models of healing, therefore, that we can sense the impact of the rise of Christianity throughout the Mediterranean world, ’whether it is in a little wooden chapel on an estate in the Limousin, as described by Gregory, or in the vigorous ‘mopping up’ by Bishop Theodoret of Cyrrhus of the sectarian villages in the hinterland of northern Syria, perched on their mountain ridges, above the disciplined life of the plains in a countryside where, as an eighteenth century traveler  observed, ‘we see despotism extending itself over all the flat country and is progress stopped at the first rock, at the first defile, that is easy of defense,’ the advance of Christianity beyond the towns was the advance of the praesentia of the saints. Throughout this book, we have seen how such a praesentia, in terms of a relic and its shrine, was heavy with a whole cluster of specific associations, involving human interaction with an invisible, ideal human being, wielding ideal potentia.

Only too frequently in late antiquity, the praesentia of the saint in the countryside ratified disruptive processes that had been the work of centuries. For we are dealing with a silent change, larger by far than the rise of the Christian church. In Gaul and Spain, the spread of Latin at the expense of local Celic dialects, and the consequent emergence of Roamce languages, betrays the final death of cultures that had existed since prehistory. The Christian church inherited the result of this change. By the sixth century, the only major settled civilization that maintained a paganism reaching back without dislocation to the pre-classical world west of India and east of Ireland was the Zorastrian culture of Sasanian Iran: elsewhere, in Egypt, in Mesopotamia, in Anatolia, and in western Europe, the ancient pre-classical world had come to a definite end. It was a silent subsidence more drastic than the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, and more irreversible than the passing of the urban gods of Greco-Roman paganism. In the countryside and the towns of Gau and Spain the praesentia of the saints reaped the fruits of a belated and largely unwitting triumph of Romanization. For the spread of Christian reverential made the final processes by which the indigenous cultures of the Western Mediterranean had been imperceptibly eroded by a slow but sure pressure from on top exercised through the grid of administration and patronage relationships that had reached ever outwards over the centuries from the towns and from the country villas of the great. A century after the end of the Western Empire, Gregory and his contemporaries could now be certain that, if all roads no longer ran to Rome, in the Touraine, at least, they would all run to Tours, ad dominum Martinum: a speck of dust  from his shrine was worth more than all the immemorial cunning of the village healers.

For, as we have seen throughout this book, the reverentia that Gregory expected derived its force from an unremitting if discreet process of ‘socialization’ taking place in a world whose expectations of the supernatural had been pieced together lovingly and with a certain urgency, from the workings of power and protection among the late Roman aristocracy in a largely urban environment. The language of the cult of saints breathed this quite distinctive atmosphere; and the rhythms and preoccupations that supported it were acted out most convincingly either at urban shrines, under the patronage of aristocratic bishops, or, as at the shrine of Saint Julian of Brioude, in a rural area dominated by aristocracy with widespread urban connections. When this reverential reached out into areas where such ‘socialization’ was less available, it was met by the tacit resistance of life styles that were less amenable to urban and aristocratic grooming. Throughout the late-antique and early-medieval period, the process of Christianization was brought to a standstill by the silent determination of human groups who would not alter the immemorial patterns of their working life to pay reverence to the saints, or bend their habits to please another class of domini. Zones of ‘raw rusticity’ hemmed in Gregory’s ceremonious world.

Occasionally, however, the new praesentia of the saint might be used to condense and resolve the ambiguities of scattered agrarian communities whose members felt enmeshed in conflicting networks of obligations. Gregory’s hagiographic work is punctuated by incidents that allow us to glimpse the malaise of a countryside faced by baffling or oppressive forms of power. For the praesentia of the saint often sparked off heady enthusiasm associated with the arrival of a new, ‘clean’ power in areas where until then, the villagers had had no choice but of forms of ‘unclean’ dependence. When the relics of Saint Julian passed through the fields of Champagne at a time when these were crowded with hired laborers drawn from the neighboring villages, their passage was marked by scenes as dramatic and as ominous as any later pursuit of the millennium:

Look at the blessed  Julian drawing near to us! Behold his power! Behold his glory! Run, lads, leave your ploughs and oxen; let the whole crowd of us follow him!

The transient praesentia of the saint had brought to these tired men the touch of an ideal dependence that could set them free, if only for a moment, from the harsh demands of Gallo-Roman landowning in a labor-intensive cereal-growing area. Many of the afflicted individuals who were emancipated from their lords or who abandoned their families on finding healing at the shrines of the saints came from peripheral areas. Faced by the ambiguities of the patronage system in which they were caught, those who had no other defense, often the women, opted dramatically for dependence on an ideal dominus at his distant shrine, rather than dependence on the all too palpable wielder of power in their locality.

Gregory registered this trickle of uprooted men and women with approval: for it is the demons that speak in them, recognizing, in unexceptionable form, the ever-widening range of the potentia of the saints. What angers him deeply, however,  is any attempt to sidestep the demands of reverential by creating for themselves indigenous pockets of praesentia which escaped the control of the bishop. Yet his libri historiarum and other later sources are full of incidents that reveal the explosive situation which the dominance of the urban saints of Gaul had created. Whenever communities were faced with threats with which the conventional therapeutics could not cope, as in the frequent recrudescences of the plague after 543, their immediate response to the situation was a reassertion of the ‘horizontal’  model of healing, if now in a new, Christian form. Soothsayers appeared, empowered by visions of the saints, to circulate new forms of remedies and to enunciate new rituals of propitiation. Prophets established penitential rituals, based on their ability as diviners to detect thieves, to recover stolen goods, and to read thoughts. These movements betrayed a poignant need to bring the praesentia of the saints, often the most authoritative and unimaginably distant of these, such as Peter and Paul, straight into the local community. And they claimed to do this without the crushing demands of reverentia mobilized around the urban shrines and its bishops. Even Gregory met his match in such men:

 

[After a bad year, in 587] there appeared in Tours a man named Desiderius, who proclaimed himself one above the common, asserting his power to work many miracles. He boasted, among other things, that messengers passed between himself and the apostles Peter and Paul. As I was absent, the country people flocked to him in multitudes, bringing with them the blind and the infirm, whom he sought to deceive rather by false teaching of hellish arts than to heal by the power of holiness.

What worried Gregory was that this was not an isolated case. These incidents stretched from the early 6th century deep into the middle ages. We can sense in them the reaction of men and women who had been pushed tragically to one side by the rise of the Christian church, and by the extension of its structures into the countryside. Religion its fullness, and full participation in the beneficence of the saints, happened elsewhere, in the towns.

For this was the paradox of late-antique Christianity as it came to e crystalized in the cult of the saints. A universal and exclusive religion, Christianity claimed to have spread to every region in the known world. In fact, having spread, it lay around the shrines of the saints like pools of water on a drying surface. For only in certain places, and in certain precisely defined social milieu, could the language of the praesentia and the potentia of the saints echo with satisfying  congruence the deepest wishes of the Cristian communities. Outside the areas where reverentia could be limned in with a full palette of late-Roman associations, there lay wide zones where Christianity could only be painted in so many washes of gray, over a countryside  where many of the tints of indigenous paganism had, long previously, grown pale. It is a sad prospect: Christian reverential created situation which the elites of the Greco-Roman world would never have envisioned in a sharp a form, the population was now divided between those who could if they wished be full participants in the grooming of a universal religion, and large areas and classes condemned, by physical distance and lack of ‘socialization,’ to a substandard version the same religion. The death of paganism in western society, and the rise of the cult of saints, with its explicitly aristocratic and urban forms, ensured that, from late antiquity onwards, the upper-class culture of Europe would always measure itself against the wildness of a rusticitas which it had itself played no small part in creating.

We also look out on a natural world made passive by being shorn of the power of the gods. It seems to me that the most marked feature of the rise of the Christian church in western Europe was the imposition of human administrative structures and and ideal of potentia linked to invisible human beings and to their visible representatives, the bishops of the towns, at the expense of traditions that had seemed to belong to the landscape itself. Saint Martin attacked those points at which the natural and the divine were held to meet: he cut down sacred trees, and he broke up processions that followed the immemorial lines between the arable and the non-arable. His successors fulminated against trees and fountains, and against forms of divination that gained access to the future through close observation of the vagaries of animal and vegetable life. They imposed rhythms of work and leisure that ignored the slow turning of the sun, the moon, and the planets through the heavens, and that reflected, indeed, a purely human time, linked to the deaths of outstanding individuals. What is at stake behind the tired repetitions of anti-pagan polemic and the admonitions  of the councils in sixth-century Gaul and Spain is nothing less than a conflict of views on the relation between man and nature.

Alphonse Dupront has made this point clear when he speaks of the nature of the Christian pilgrimage site:

The place in the fullness of meaning is a cosmic reality, some physical accident that in each case it consecrates. And the whole story of the Christian pilgrimage aims to baptize the pagan - that is, to anthropomorphize the cosmic. . . The human screen or 'hominization' are coherent acts without any Christian consideration of the place of pilgrimage.

 

This was certainly the opinion of the fifth-century bishop of Javols, as his activities were remembered by Gregory. When he spread Christianity into the  Auvergne, he found the country folk celebrating a three-day festival with offerings on the edge of a marsh formed in a volcanic crater within a mountain top. ‘Nullest religo in stagno,’ he said.

There can be no religion in a swamp. But rather acknowledge God and give veneration to his friends. Adore Saint Hilarius, the bishop of God, whose relics are installed here. He can act as your intercessor for the mercy of God.

What happens later may seem no great change. The pilgrimage to the mountain top continued. But the religio has well and truly gone out of the swamp. Instead, we have a human artifact –a stone building; the praesentia of a human being – the relic of Saint Hilarius; and Saint Hilarious’s power is suppose to operate through the quintessentially human relationships of friendship and intercession. The site itself is incorporated into the administrative structure dependent on the authority of human beings resident in a town far removed from the signifying folds of the once holy landscape; it has become a church in the diocese of the bishops of Javols. Seen in this way, the rise of Christianity in Western Europe is a chapter in the ‘hominization’ of the natural world.

This is a triumph which modern scholars need not witness with quite the same degree of enthusiasm as Gregory of Tours. Faced with the majesty of mountain tops and with the long, slow wisdom of pre-Christian Europe, Gregory’s reverentia seems brittle and not a little abrasive: it reflects the comparatively rapid growth of an inward-looking institution, gripped to the point of obsession with the need to understand relations with the unseen in a language of human interaction hammered out within the narrow confines of late-Roman urban and aristocratic society. Wherever we look, in the early centuries of the cult of the Saints, we see the victory of a language drawn from observed human relations over the less articulate and less articulable certainties of an earlier age.

Yet we must do justice to the resolution of the four remarkable generations that stretched from Paulinus’s decision to settle in Nolas, to the childhood memories of Gregory of Tours. The old world had its limitations: as Sir James Frazer said in his Golden Bough: ‘God my pardon sin, but Nature cannot.’ God and his human friends  had come to pardon sin. Among the three men we have met in these chapters, to opt so obsessively for a patterning of expectations of the supernatural that reflected current relationships of dependence always meant more than to opt for a language  top heavy with associations of the exercise of power and patronage. In late-Roman conditions, potentia had a more gentle reverse side. Patronage and dependence, even the exigencies of aristocratic amicitia, might seem hard, binding relations to us; but it was through these that late-Roman men hoped to gain that freedom of action from which the miracle of justice, mercy, and a sense of solidarity with their fellow humans might spring.

We, who live in a world where justice, mercy, and the acceptance of the majority of our fellows is quite as rare and as fragile as a suspension of the observed laws of society as was that blessed moment of amnesty associated with the praesentia of the saints in the late-Roman community, should learn to look with greater sympathy and, hence, with greater scholarly care, at the dogged concern of late-antique Christians to ensure that, in their world, there should be a place where men could stand in the searching and merciful presence of a fellow human being.




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Marcellus Empiricus,  (“Marcellus of Bordeaux”), was a Latin medical writer from Gaul at the turn of the 4th and 5th centuries. His only extant work is the De medicamentis, a compendium of pharmacological preparations drawing on the work of multiple medical and scientific writers as well as on folk remedies and magic. It is a significant if quirky text in the history of European medical writing, an infrequent subject of monographs, but regularly mined as a source for magic charms, Celtic herbology and lore, and the linguistic study of Gaulish and Vulgar Latin.