A FOREIGN MILITARY OPERATION is a systematic imposition of
violence on an entire population. Of the many crimes committed against the
Iraqi people, most have occurred unnoticed by the American people or the media.
Americans, led to believe their soldiers and marines would be welcomed as
liberators, still have little idea what the occupation is really like from the
perspective of Iraqis. Although I am an American, born and raised in New York
City, I came closer to experiencing what it feels like to be an Iraqi than most
of my colleagues. I often say that the secret to my success as a journalist in
Iraq is my melanin advantage. I inherited my Iranian father’s Middle East
features, which allowed me to go unnoticed in Iraq, march in demonstrations,
sit in mosques, walk through Falluja’s worst neighborhoods, sit in taxis and
restaurants and look like every other Iraqi. My ability to blend in also
allowed me to relate to the American occupier in a different way, for he looked
at me as if I were another “hajji,” the “gook” of the war in Iraq.
I first realized my advantage in April 2003, when I was
sitting with a group of American soldiers and another soldier walked up and
wondered what this hajji (me) had done to get arrested. Later that summer I
walked in the direction of an American tank and heard one soldier say about me,
“that’s the biggest fuckin’ Iraqi [pronounced ‘eye-raki] I ever saw.” Another
soldier, who was by the gun, replied, “I don’t care how big he is, if he
doesn’t stop movin’ I’m gonna shoot him.”
I was lucky enough to have my American passport in my
pocket, which I promptly took out and waved, shouting, “Don’t shoot, I’m an
American!” It was my first encounter with hostile checkpoints but hardly my
last, and I grew to fear the unpredictable American military, which could kill
me for looking like an Iraqi male of fighting age. Countless other Iraqis were
not so lucky enough to speak English or carry an American passport, and entire
families were killed in their cars when the approached checkpoints.
In 2004 the
British medical journal The Lancet
estimated that by September of that year, one hundred thousand Iraqis had died
as the result of the American occupation, most of them had died violently,
largely from American airstrikes. Although this figure was challenged by many,
especially the partisan backers of the war, it seemed perfectly plausible to me
based on what I had seen during the postwar period in Iraq. What I never
understood was why more journalists did not focus on this, choosing instead to
look for the “good news” and to go along with the official story. I never
understood why more journalists did not write about the daily Abu Ghraibs that
were so essential to the occupation.
Iraq
The year 2008 ended with Muntadhar al-Zeidi reminding
President Bush and the world for only a moment about the Iraqi victims. During
a press conference on Bush’s last visit to the country, Zeidi spoke for the
masses in the Arab world and beyond when he shouted, “This is a farewell kiss
from the Iraqi people, you dog!” as he threw his first shoe at the American
president. Zeidi was a secular, left-leaning Shiite from Sadr City whose work
as a reporter for Baghdadiya television had won him local acclaim because of
his focus on the suffering of innocent Iraqis. He had been arrested twice by
the American army and kidnapped once by a militia.
He remembered, as did all Iraqis, that the American
occupation had not begun with the surge.
The story of the American occupation was not one of smart officers contributing
to the reduction of violence and increase in stability. That was only one chapter in a longer
story of painful, humiliating, sanctions, wars, and bloody occupation. Those with short memories, such as New
York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, might remember the American
occupation “a million acts of
kindness.” But to Iraqis and anyone else sensitive enough to view them as
humans, the occupation was one million acts of violence and humiliation or one
million explosives. There was nothing for Bush to be triumphal about during his
farewell press conference. Even the surge had exacted a costly toll on Iraqis.
Thousands more had been killed, arrested, thrown into overcrowded prisons, and
rarely put on trial, their families deprived of them. The surge was not about
victory. With a cost so high, there could be no victory. COIN
(Counterinsurgency) is still violence, and the occupation persisted, imposing
violence on an entire country. As Zeidi threw his second shoe in a last
desperate act of defiance, he remembered these victims and shouted, “This for
the widows and orphans and all those killed in Iraq!”
Millions of
Iraqis had fled their homes. Tens of thousands of Iraqi men spent years in
American prisons. The new Iraqi state was among the most corrupt in the world.
It was often brutal. It failed to provide adequate services to its people,
millions of whom were barely able to survive. Iraqis were traumatized. This
upheaval did not spare Iraq’s neighbors either. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi
refugees languished in exile. Sectarianism increased in the region. Weapons,
tactics, and veterans of the jihad made their way into neighboring countries.
And now the American “victory” in Iraq was being imposed on the people of
Afghanistan.
Afghanistan
In 2005 the respected COIN theorist and practitioner Kalev
Sepp – a former Special Forces officer and deputy assistant secretary of
defense for special operations capabilities – wrote a seminal article, “Best
Practices in Counterinsurgency,” in Military
Review. In the article Sepp claimed that a country’s political leaders (and
not the military) must direct the struggle to win the allegiance of the people,
that the “security of the people must be assured along with food, water,
shelter, health care, and a means of living. These are human rights, along with
freedom of worship, access to education, and equal rights for women. The
failure of counterinsurgencies and the root cause of the insurgencies
themselves can often be traced to government disregard of these basic rights.”
In addition, Sepp noted, Intelligence operations that help
detect terrorist insurgents for arrest and prosecution are the single most
important practice to protect a population from threats to its security.
Honest, trained, robust police forces responsible for security can gather
intelligence at the community level. Historically, robustness in wartime
requires a ratio of 20 police and auxiliaries for each 1,000 civilians. In
turn, an incorrupt, functioning judiciary must support the police.”
On each of Sepp’s criteria Afghanistan has been a study in
abject failure. The civilian Afghan government is insignificant; it is the
American military that is leading the war effort. The Afghan government does
not provide and services or protect rights. Moreover the U.S. military
regularly kills civilians with impunity, arresting many more and holding them
without trial. The Taliban have not been penetrated. There is no honest or
well-trained police force, and the American-led coalition will never come near
to the ratio that Sepp calls for.
COIN was a massive endeavor, I was told by retired Col. Pat
Lang, who had conducted COIN operations in Vietnam, Latin America, and
elsewhere. There were insufficient resources committed to doing it in Afghanistan,
but if the Americans didn’t plan owning Afghanistan, he argued, why waste time
on it? It was worth the expenditure of resources only if you were the local
government seeking to establish authority, or an imperialist power that wanted
to hang around for a while. There were thirty million people in Afghanistan,
and they were widely dispersed in small towns. “You have to provide security
for the whole country,” he said, “because if you move around they just move in
behind you and undo what you did. So you need to have effective security and
massive multifaceted development organization the covers the whole place. COIN
advisors have to stay in place all the time; they can’t commute to work. If
you’re going to do COIN, it really amounts to nation building, and troops are
there to provide protection for nation builders. Afghanistan doesn’t matter.
The Taliban is not part of the worldwide jihadi community a war with the U.S.
We need to disaggregate Taliban from Al Qaeda. The idea that Al Qaeda is an
existential threat to the U.S., it’s so absurd that you don’t know how to deal
with it.”
. . . . .
The American’s obsession with Afghanistan’s elections also
resembled their Iraqi approach, which erroneously focused on landmark events.
Just as in Iraq, when elections helped enshrine sectarianism and paved the way
to civil war, so too in Afghanistan the election empowered the warlords,
enshrined a corrupt order; and, in the case of the 2009 elections, completely
discredited the government and its foreign backers.
Strategy in Afghanistan was put on hold so that elections
could be held. Turnout in the south was less than ten percent, and zero in some
places. There was overwhelming evidence of systematic election fraud and ballot
stuffing. The Taliban managed to reduce the turnout compared to previous years.
There were even thousand polling stations throughout the country, so the
Taliban could not actually disrupted voting too much. It would have been bad PR
for them to kill too many civilians. Their lack of operations might have shown
that even they knew the elections didn’t matter and that nothing could better
serve their ends than letting the elections take place and ending up with a
deeply flawed result. Meanwhile, the Americans and their allies immediately
hailed the elections as a success, merely because violence was low, thus
further associating themselves with a corrupt government. How could Afghans
take Americans seriously when they backed a corrupt government and were deeply
implicated in corruption? The flawed elections were a message to Afghans that there
was no hope of improvement or change.
In September 2009 Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s assessment of
the war in Afghanistan was leaked to the media. He had been advised by a team of
experts, many of them celebrity pundits from Washington think tanks. Only one
of his advisers was an expert on Afghanistan. When Petraeus conducted his Iraq
review, he called on people who really knew Iraq to join his “brain trust.”
McChrystal called in advisers from both sides of the political divide in
Washington who already believed that population-centric COIN was the solution
to everything. It was a savvy move, sure to help him get support in Congress.
There was a cult of celebrity in the DC policy set. Many of the same pseudo
experts who were once convinced that the war in Iraq was the most important
thing in the world, even at the expense of Afghanistan, were now convinced that
Afghanistan was most important thing in the world, and were organizing panels
with other pseudo experts in Washington think tanks. They offered trending
solutions, like an industry giving managed and preplanned narratives about was
going on. COIN advocates from DC think tanks were connected to political
appointees who came from DC think tanks. There was an explosion of commentary
on Afghanistan coming from positions of ignorance, quoting generalities.
McChrystal himself had been chosen because he could drum up bi-partisan
support. He was another hero general like Petraeus, with an aura of
infallibility – he was there to save the day. Fawning articles praised his low
percentage of body fat, his ascetic habit of eating one meal a day, his
repetition of simple COIN aphorism that had already become clichés in Iraq by
2007. He was another warrior scholar the media could write panegyrics about.
Supporters of McChrystal said “he gets it,” as if there was a magic COIN formula discovered
in 2009. But Afghans have a memory. They remember, for example, that the
American-backed mujahideen killed thousands of Afghan teachers and bombed
schools in the name of their anti-Soviet jihad. The Taliban atrocities had not
arisen in a vacuum. Similarly, past American actions have consequences.
Opinions were already formed. The Taliban were gaining power thanks to American
actions and alliances. Warlords were empowered by the Americans. No justice was
sought for victims. The government and police were corrupt. The president stole
the elections. The message was that there was no justice, and a pervasive sense
of lawlessness and impunity had set in. Afghans who had been humiliated or
victimized by the Americans and their allies were unlikely to become smitten by
then merely because of some aid they received. And the aid was relatively small
compared to other international projects, like Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, and East
Timor. The Americans thought that by building roads they could win over
opinion. But roads are just as useful for insurgents as they are for the
occupiers. The Americans failed to convince the Afghan that they should be like
them or want them to stay, and they certainly had not been convinced that
Karzai’s government has legitimacy. You can’t win hearts and minds when you are
an occupying force.
The Taliban was the most obscurantist, backward, traditional
and despised government on earth. The fact that the Taliban was making a
comeback was a testimony to the regime that the U.S. set up there, and to the
atrocities that had been committed in Afghanistan by occupation troops and
their Afghan allies. It was sheer arrogance to think that adding another thirty
thousand or fifty thousand troops would change the situation so much that the
occupation would become an attractive alternative.
There is little evidence that aid money in COIN had an
impact. There was not a strong correlation between poverty and insecurity or
between aid money a security. The more insecure you were, the more development
money you got. The safer provinces felt as if they were being penalized for not
having Taliban or poppy cultivation. The aid system raised expectations but
didn’t satisfy them. Life remained nasty, brutish, and short for most Afghans.
Aid and force do not go well together. The Americans assumed
that material goods superseded all other values. This was not true in Iraq or
Afghanistan. Positive as the aid was, it did not outweigh the civilian
casualties or the offensive and humiliating behavior of the past eight years.
In Iraq it took the trauma of the civil war to make the Americans look good.
There might be a new administration in Washington, but for Afghan it was the
same America: the America of civilian casualties, night raids, foreign
occupation, Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib – the America seemingly at war with Islam.
The Pentagon propaganda machine, for instance, turned Marja
from a backwater to a key strategic city, and the American media accepted it.
But in fact there were only a few thousand people living in Marja. It took
months and thousands of troops for the Americans to seize Marja, only to learn
that the Taliban were popular there. And there were up to twenty thousand
similar Marjas throughout the country. In Marja ANCOP too proved a failure,
incompetent and dependent upon the Americans. Fighting remained frequent. The
Americans were not effective in evaluation Afghan police units. Although hailed
as an elite, the ANCOP annual attrition rate due to all causes ranged from
seventy to one hundred and forty percent. Even by local standards they weren’t
an elite.
The story of Marja was meant to be the first sally in a
larger campaign to expel the Taliban from the southern heartland, especially
Kandahar. The Americans thought if they could wrest it from Taliban hands, then
it would turn the tide against the Taliban. But Kandahar meant little to
anybody that wasn’t a Kandahari. It was part of the same focus on population
centers that were overwhelmingly urban.
Violence was getting worse. How long would the Afghan people
accept the presence of armed foreigners in their country? Even a message of help can be
humiliating, more so when it is backed by a gun. The Americans underestimated
the importance of dignity and the extent to which their very presence in
Afghanistan was deeply offensive.
In May 206 riots erupted in Kabul after a road accident with
American forces, and the Americans shot at the crowd. The episode revealed an
underlying anger that could explode at any moment. In September 2009 a British
plane dropped a box of leaflets that failed to open, landing on a girl and
killing her. Given that most Afghans are illiterate, it would not have been any
more persuasive had it opened. Despite the lip service given to “protecting the
population” in 2010 the American-led coalition killed far more civilians than
previous years. In February a night raid by American special forces killed two
pregnant women; the Americans attempted to cover it up. “Son of an American”
has become and insult among Pashtuns the way “Son of a Russian” once was.
At any rate, Americans lacked the political will for a
long-term commitment to Afghanistan, regardless of whether it was right or
wrong. Americans would bail on Afghanistan sooner or later. It would be tragic
if it happened within Obama’s eighteen- month deadline or after five years.
There was no way to “fix” Afghanistan.
In fact, the Soviets themselves never lost their war in Afghanistan; the
puppet regime they installed had pretty much crushed the mujahideen until the
Soviets withdrew support. The Soviets won their last battle in Khost’s
Operation Magistal. But it made no difference. Only the rusting ruins of tanks
and a few Russian-speaking Afghans remain. The Americans too weren’t losing,
stressed a retired military officer working on security in Afghanistan. “Every
time our boys face them, they win,” he said. “We’re winning every day. Are we
going to keep winning for twenty years?”