In 2003, one year after Saddam Hussein was toppled, Paul
Bremer, the American-appointed head of the Coalition Provisional Authority,
declared Iraq “open for business” and spelled out a set of 100 orders that came
to be known as the Bremer Orders. These mandated selling off several hundred
state-run enterprises, permitting full ownership rights of Iraqi businesses by
foreign firms and full repatriation of profits to foreign firms, opening Iraq’s
banks to foreign ownership and control, and eliminating tariffs – in short,
making Iraq a new playground of world finance and investment. At the time time,
the Bremer Orders restricted labor and
throttled back public goods and services. They outlawed strikes and eliminated
the right to unionize in most sectors, mandated a regressive flat tax on
income, lowered the corporate rate to a flat 15 percent, and eliminated taxes
on profits repatriated to foreign-owned businesses.
Many of these orders were in violation of the Geneva and
Hague Conventions concerning war, occupation, and international relations,
which mandate that an occupying power must guard, rather than sell off the
assets of the occupied country. But if illegal under international law, the orders
could be implemented by a sovereign
Iraqi government. To that end, an interim government was appointed by the
United States in late 2002 and was pressed to ratify the orders when it was
pronounced “sovereign” in 2004. And lest future elected governments not be so
pliable, one order declares that no elected Iraqi government will have the
power to alter them.
The Bremer Orders and the U.S. dominated state under
construction that ratified and executed them obviously exemplify a host of
neo-liberal features: the use of a calamity (“shock doctrine”) to impose
neo-liberal reforms; the elimination of public ownership and welfare; the
reduction of taxes and tariffs; the extensive use of the state to structure
market competition through inequality; the break-up of labor and popular
solidarities; the creation of ideal conditions for global finance and investment
capital. Yet the orders, defined as “binding instructions or directives to the Iraqi
people that create [penal consequences or have a direct bearing on the way
Iraqis are regulated, including changes to Iraqi law,” would seem to be at odds
with the idea of the soft power of governance and best practices we have been
considering as the mode through which neoliberal rationality is disseminated.
As William Engdahl notes, the orders had the shape of “do it or die.” But what
we will seen close inspection is the importance of law in codifying and
disseminating best practices, on the one side, and the role of best practices
in generating law and policy, on the other. The orders emanated from neoliberal
understanding of best practices and
set them in motion. Law can be mobilized to structure competition and
facilitate capital accumulation, but also to codify and animate best practices
in lieu of violence or commands. Close inspection of one Bremer order vividly
illustrates this concatenation of effects.
Bremer Order 81, the “Patent, Industrial Design, Undisclosed
Information, Integrated Circuits and Plant Variety Law,” includes a prohibition
against “the re-use of crop seeds of protected varieties.” Why a law against
seed saving and reuse? The protected varieties named in the order refer to
genetically modified seed produced by Monsanto, Dow, DuPont, and other
agribusiness giants, and at first blush, the prohibition seems mainly designed
to protect the intellectual property rights of these firms – farmers cannot just
buy the seed once and then pirate its offspring: ruthless, perhaps, but hardly
unethical or at least, uncommon. And hardly relevant to best practices.
However, the story only begins with the letter of the law.
Monsanto and other large seed corporations are selling a
package around the world that is transforming agriculture: the package includes
patented, genetically modified seed and the fertilizers and pesticides that go
with it. With the promise of a giant crop yield and an end to struggling with
pests, the agribusiness giants aim to convert farers across the developing
world from “traditional” to “modern” techniques, materials, and markets.
Since at least 8000 B.C. Iraqi farmers have successfully
grown wheat without this package in what is know to this day as the Fertile
Crescent. Over the centuries, farmers cultivated the range of varieties
essential to crop sustainability by saving seeds from thriving wheat plants one
year and planting and cross-pollinating them with seeds of different strengths
the following year. By using such practices, the crop continually improves and
diversifies, partly through selection by experienced farmers, partly through
plant evolution, partly through open pollination conducted by winds, insects
and animals. As late as 2002, writes ecologist Jeremy Smith, the Federal
Accounting Office ‘estimated that 97 percent of Iraqi farmers” engaged in these
practices, with the consequence “that there are now over 200,000 known
varieties of wheat in the world.
For millennia, Fertile Crescent farmers informally shred and traded seeds at harvest and planting time. In the twentieth century, they shifted to storing and retrieving seed from a national seed bank, located, alas, in Abu Ghraib, where the entire bank vanished after the bombings and occupation. This calamity, following war and episodes of drought since 12991 and combined with the embargo by the United States and United Kingdom that limited access to agricultural equipment, caused Iraqi wheat production to drop dramatically and become unable to sustain the population for the first time in centuries. The production crisis opened the door for the agri-business to move in: the seed bank destroyed, the harvest yield dramatically down due to natural disaster and years of war, Iraqi farmers were vulnerable, desperate and exploitable. They needed seed and agri-business-backed relief efforts were there to provide it. Bremer Order 81 sealed the farmer’s permanent dependence on the agri-business giants.
For millennia, Fertile Crescent farmers informally shred and traded seeds at harvest and planting time. In the twentieth century, they shifted to storing and retrieving seed from a national seed bank, located, alas, in Abu Ghraib, where the entire bank vanished after the bombings and occupation. This calamity, following war and episodes of drought since 12991 and combined with the embargo by the United States and United Kingdom that limited access to agricultural equipment, caused Iraqi wheat production to drop dramatically and become unable to sustain the population for the first time in centuries. The production crisis opened the door for the agri-business to move in: the seed bank destroyed, the harvest yield dramatically down due to natural disaster and years of war, Iraqi farmers were vulnerable, desperate and exploitable. They needed seed and agri-business-backed relief efforts were there to provide it. Bremer Order 81 sealed the farmer’s permanent dependence on the agri-business giants.
The U.S. government handout of genetically modified seed in
2004 was like offering heroin to a desperate single mother out of a job, facing
eviction, and despairing of the future. Not only did it promise relief, but the
first bag was free. It permanently attached the recipient to the supplier, and
the addiction was deadly – to sustainable Iraqi farming, Iraqi self-sufficiency,
and even the farmers themselves.
As the ink dried on the Bremer Orders, the U.S. Agency for
International Development began delivering thousands of tons of wheat seed to
the Iraq Agricultural Ministry, which distributed it at little or no cost to
Iraqi farmers. An Arizona agriresearch firm, the World Wide Wheat Company,
provided thousands more bags of free seed. These donations were combined with
demonstration plots, run by Texas A&M for USAID and aimed at teaching Iraqi
farmers how to grow the new high-yield crops. Thousands of farmers were lured
into the new agricultural techniques, which also required the use of specialized
fungicides, pesticides and herbicides. Free seed, the promise of soaring
production levels, and their teachers’ insistence that the uniform crops and
accompanying chemicals represented modernity, wealth, and the future – together
, these transformed centuries of Iraqi agriculture overnight. Bremer Order 81
secured that transformation. Prohibited from saving seeds of protected
varieties, Iraqi famers are now permanently bound to their foreign dealers,
whose seed is ubiquitous in their fields, intermixed with all the heritage seed.
Organic, diversified, low-cost, ecologically sustainable wheat production in
Iraq is finished.
Half the wheat seeds distributed in post-Saddam Iraq were
for bread wheat; the other half was for pasta wheat, and pasty a is no part of
the the Iraqi die. Thus, in addition to making Iraqi farmers dependent on giant
corporations whose seeds, licensing, and chemicals they must now purchase
annually (and for which state subsidies are available, while other farm
subsidies have been eliminated), they were being transformed from multi-crop local
food providers into monocrop participants in global; import-export markets.
Today, Iraqi farmers generate profits for Monsanto by supplying pasta to Texas
school cafeterias, while Iraq has become an importer of staples formerly grown
on its own soil.
There is more to this heartbreaking story of the destruction
of thousands of years of sustainable agriculture and of what some activists
call “food sovereignty,” but let us fast-forward to one possible future. A
similar experiment took place in India in the 1990s. Tens of thousands of farmers
were lured into using genetically modified cotton seed by village-to village
agribusiness representatives promising bigger crops with export potential,
something especially important at a time when neoliberal reforms were
eliminating government price supports and subsidies for cotton production.
Farmers were abetted in the transition
by the availability of large bank loans to purchase seed and the needed
pesticides, fungicides, and herbicides. Like the Iraqis, Indian cotton farmers
were not only adopting new agricultural technologies, but becoming fully
integrated into world markets and debt finance.
The problem is that farming in general is uniquely
vulnerable to fluctuations in nature, such as draughts and floods, and farming
for export is also vulnerable to fluctuations in world markets. One bad year
with either can leave debt-burdened farmers without the means to repay loans, which
means bad credit, which means the inability to borrow more (or borrowing at
scandalous rates), which means the inability to plant and thus recoup losses.
This is what happened in India a decade ago, pushing cotton farmers into an
ever-deepening hole of debt. The result? An epidemic of farmer suicides (at
least twenty thousand at this point), often committed by drinking a bottle of
RoundUp, the Monsanto-produced herbicide that kills everything except Monsanto’s
genetically modified seed.
An improved investment climate in Iraq, its integration into
world trade, elimination of its nontransparent state ownership and planning in
favor of private enterprise – these are the “outcomes” that Bremer Order 81
aims to achieve. What Nancy Scola calls the “legal tweak” that effectively
ended seed saving was the reform required to bring them about. Casting itself,
at the same time, as the opposite of regulation, this order launched the
practices that would integrate Iraqi farming and farmers into the global order,
an integration achieved by eliminating, on the other hand, nonmonetary trade,
local sourcing , and traditional techniques and by generating, on the other,
dependence on foreign corporations, on fertilizers and pesticides, on debt
financing, and on global export and import markets. The legal tweak instigates
these best practices but, like the Protestant Ethic Weber deemed crucial to
inaugurating capitalism, its importance falls away once the machinery is in
motion. Thus, Order 81, epitomizes the neoliberal mobilization of law not to
repress punish, but to structure competition and effect “the conduct of
conduct.” It alters one tiny practice (seed saving) to inaugurate the
convergent purposes of Iraqi economic growth, protection of corporate
intellectual property, and Iraqi participation in world trade and finance.
Visible in the story of Order 81 is the specific meshing of
state and business aims through neo-liberal governance, a meshing that exceeds
the interlocking directorates or quid pro quo arrangements familiar from past
iteratons of capitalism. The project of the state is to facilitate economic growth,
not the well-being of a particular sector or people, and the project of capital
is to generate such growth, though now, under neo-liberalism, business devotes
itself to local development ( ‘privatization’)as government devotes itself to
global positioning; governments negotiate contracts as firms become educators;
the government concerns itself with the investment climate,(protecting
intellectual property, providing tax shelters and subsidies and a deregulated
environment); business become ‘ethical actors’ [‘’points of light’], supposedly
representing the interests of the needy or underserved.
Order 81 is reputed to have been drafted by Monsanto and emerges from the Bush Administration’s close ties to agribusinesses (and the extensive presence in the Bush cabinet of those ties), yet these facts are almost beside the point. The orders expressed and executed Bremer’s purpose in Iraq, which was not to democratize it, but to neoliberalize it. In this regard, even more significant than Monsanto’s direct influence is that the orders fostering deregulation, privatization and the structuring of competition preceded the building of democratic institutions; orders first, then constitutions, parliaments, councils, elections and civil liberties. It is also noteworthy that the provisional government authorizing them, whose members were handpicked by the Bremer team and subject in all their actions to Bremer’s veto, consisted of only those who supported the U.S. occupation. In turn, this government proposed a process for ratifying the permanent constitution that excluded all parties not supporting the occupation. Again, this could be read as the direct and heavy hand of the United States in making Iraq a playground for international capital and especially for U.S. Corporations, ranging from Haliburton to Monsanto. More important, however, are the ways in which these moves represent distinctive features of neoliberal governance: while states operating on a business model may eschew excessive uses of violence or unconstitutional conduct, they are also not about to enfranchise competing or oppositional interests, cede control or prioritize justice and welfare over investment climate and economic growth.
Order 81 is reputed to have been drafted by Monsanto and emerges from the Bush Administration’s close ties to agribusinesses (and the extensive presence in the Bush cabinet of those ties), yet these facts are almost beside the point. The orders expressed and executed Bremer’s purpose in Iraq, which was not to democratize it, but to neoliberalize it. In this regard, even more significant than Monsanto’s direct influence is that the orders fostering deregulation, privatization and the structuring of competition preceded the building of democratic institutions; orders first, then constitutions, parliaments, councils, elections and civil liberties. It is also noteworthy that the provisional government authorizing them, whose members were handpicked by the Bremer team and subject in all their actions to Bremer’s veto, consisted of only those who supported the U.S. occupation. In turn, this government proposed a process for ratifying the permanent constitution that excluded all parties not supporting the occupation. Again, this could be read as the direct and heavy hand of the United States in making Iraq a playground for international capital and especially for U.S. Corporations, ranging from Haliburton to Monsanto. More important, however, are the ways in which these moves represent distinctive features of neoliberal governance: while states operating on a business model may eschew excessive uses of violence or unconstitutional conduct, they are also not about to enfranchise competing or oppositional interests, cede control or prioritize justice and welfare over investment climate and economic growth.
The Bremer Orders reflect a fundamental shift in state purposes
and legitimacy that is more important than the question of precisely which
politicians, corporations and banks are in bed with one another. That old model
could easily be charged with corruption. Neoliberal governance facilitates a
more open-handed and effective - ‘soft’-
fusion of political and economic power, one that largely eliminates the scandal
of corruption [ or at least makes it more difficult to detect or prosecute] as
it erases differences in goals and governance between states and capital,
indeed, as ‘best practices’ circulating between them perform this erasure. . .
.
Intensified inequality, crass commodification and commerce,
ever growing corporate influence in government, economic havoc and instability –
certainly all these are consequences of neoliberal policy, and all are material
for loathing and popular protest, as indeed, Occupy Wall Street, the Southern
European protests against austerity policies, and earlier, the “Anti-globalization”
movement loathed and protested them. However, in this book, neoliberalism is
formulated somewhat differently and focuses on different deleterious effects.
In contrast with the understanding of neoliberalism as a set of state policies,
a phase of capitalism, or an ideology that set loose the market tp restore
profitability for a capitalist class, I join
Michael Foucault and others in conceiving neoliberalism as an order of normative reason that, when it
become ascendant, takes shape as a governing rationality extending a specific
formulation of economic values, practices, and metrics to every dimension of
human life.
This governing rationality involves what Koray Caliskan and
Michel Callon term the “economization” of hithertofore noneconomic spheres and
practices, a process of remaking the knowledge, form, content, and conduct
appropriate to these spheres and practices. Importantly, such economization may
not always involve monetization. That is, we may think and act like
contemporary market subjects where monetary wealth generation is not the
immediate issue, for example, in approaching one’s education, health, fitness,
family life, or neighborhood. To speak of the relentless and ubiquitous
economization of all features of life by neoliberalism is thus not to claim
that neoliberalism literally marketizes
all spheres, even as such marketization is certainly one important effect of
neoliberalism. Rather, the point is that neoliberal rationality disseminates
the model of the market to all domains and activities –even where money is not
the issue – and configures human beings exhaustively as market actors, always,
only, and everywhere as homo oeconomicus.
[e.g. ‘What do you buy
into?’ ‘What are you selling?’]